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ABSTRACT 
  This Article proposes that dissenting Supreme Court Justices 
provide cues in their written opinions about how future litigants can 
reframe case facts and legal arguments in similar future cases to 
garner majority support. Questions of federal-state power cut across 
most other substantive legal issues, and this can provide a mechanism 
for splitting existing majorities in future cases. By signaling to future 
litigants when this potential exists, dissenting judges can transform a 
dissent into a majority in similar future cases. 
  We undertake an empirical investigation of dissenting opinions in 
which the dissenting Justice suggests that future cases ought to be 
framed in terms of federal-state powers. We show that when 
dissenting opinions signal a preference for transforming an issue into 
an argument about federal-state power, more subsequent cases in that 
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area are decided on that basis. Moreover, the previous minority 
coalition is in the majority significantly more often, showing that these 
signals are systematically successful. Not only can federalism-based 
dissents transform the rhetoric of cases, they can systematically and 
significantly shift the outcome of cases in the direction of the 
dissenting Justices’ views. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why do judges dissent? Legal scholars have long struggled to 
answer this seemingly simple question satisfactorily. One traditional 
legal view is that the dissenting judge is simply laying out an 
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alternative theory of the law1—but by definition, the court has 
rejected that interpretation of the law. To the extent that we believe 
the myth that judges discover the law, dissents simply represent 
rejected dead ends along that path of discovery. A more public-choice 
view is that dissents are an attempt to convince the majority of its 
error.2 This could explain why judges circulate drafts of dissents—but 
by the time of publication, dissenting judges have lost the fight. A 
game theoretic twist on this view is that publication is necessary to 
make those drafts credible threats. Under this theory, it is necessary 
to publish even when the fight has been lost; otherwise, future threats 
to dissent will not be credible.3 But that argument necessarily assumes 
that dissenting is costly to the court, presumably by harming judicial 
legitimacy and challenging the fiction of judges as apolitical 
 
 1. One judge described judges as having the “right and duty” to dissent and to “honestly 
state[] the law and its application to the case as conscience dictates.” Michael Kirby, Justice, 
High Court of Australia, Judicial Dissent, Address to the Law Students’ Society of James Cook 
University at Cairns (Feb. 26, 2005), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/ 
kirbyj_feb05.html. There is dispute, however, as to the effect of expressing that disagreement. 
For example, Chief Justice Taft described dissents as “a form of egotism.” He continued, “They 
don’t do any good, and only weaken the prestige of the Court. It is much more important what 
the Court thinks than what any one thinks.” Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van 
Devanter (Dec. 26, 1921) (on file with the Library of Congress), quoted in Robert Post, The 
Supreme Court Opinion As Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and 
Decisionmaking in the Taft Court 42 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 
No. 48, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=265946. In contrast, Professor Sunstein 
argues that the potential of a colleague to dissent can “reduce the likelihood of . . . an incorrect 
or lawless decision [and render a decision] more likely to be right, and less likely to be political 
in a pejorative sense.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 184 (2003). 
 2. This analysis has been particularly well developed in the context of dissents from 
denials of certiorari. Famously, Justice Stevens published an opinion in response to a dissent 
from denial: “One characteristic of all opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari is 
manifest. They are totally unnecessary. They are examples of the purest form of dicta . . . .” 
Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 944–45 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the 
petition for writ of certiorari). Such a dissent, however, can have the benefit that it “sometimes 
persuades other Justices to change their votes and a petition is granted that would otherwise 
have been denied.” Id. at 945–46; see also H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA 
SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 170–92 (1991) (providing interviews with 
numerous Justices who describe using dissents from denial of certiorari as a method of 
persuading fellow Justices to hear a case). For a discussion of different categories of dissent 
from denial of certiorari—ranging from “neutral grounds” dissents, to “irredentist” dissents, to 
dissents as forward-looking policy arguments—see Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari 
Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1127, 1262 (1979). 
 3. Cf. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 62 (1998) (noting in 
the context of dissents from denial of certiorari that Justices must “[o]n occasion . . . publish so 
that their future threats will be credible”). 
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discoverers of law.4 Presumably, this harm applies as much to the 
dissenting judge as to the majority judge, and so the theory cannot 
really explain why two-thirds of all cases involve published dissents.5 
We propose an alternative theory: at least some dissents may be 
explained as signals from judges to litigants about how to frame 
future similar cases to increase the chance of success for the argument 
the dissenting judge supports. 
This will not explain all dissents. Sometimes dissents are simply 
expressions of frustration or strength of feeling—as emphasized when 
read aloud from the bench—or attempts to instigate a change of heart 
in a colleague somewhere down the line. But when a dissenter 
pursues an alternative line of reasoning as a means of deciding the 
case differently, it can mean that the judge is doing more than simply 
arguing the point. The act of publicly dissenting suggests that a judge 
has not given up on the losing side of an argument; by continuing to 
argue the point, the judge may be laying the logical groundwork for 
future cases. Success in the form of the dissenter’s preferred outcome 
eventually winning on the merits may only come when new judges are 
appointed. But a more impatient judge may have another strategy 
available. In dissenting, a judge may be attempting to summon 
litigation with new case facts amenable to an alternative legal 
argument, enabling the court to reach an alternative conclusion. In 
other words, these dissents can signal how to frame future litigation to 
create a more persuasive line of reasoning that encourages at least 
some judges in the previous majority coalition to consider a different 
argument when deciding on the merits. In this way, the dissenting 
judge identifies a potential fissure in the majority coalition that can be 
exploited by future litigants. 
 
 4. This is particularly relevant when judges occasionally emphasize their displeasure in 
harsh terms, even though it is clearly too late to influence the decision—for example, by 
extravagantly damning their colleagues. In response to his fellow Justices’ ruling that the death 
penalty cannot apply to defendants with mental retardation, Justice Scalia awarded his 
colleagues “the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate” evidence for the 
majority’s argument. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002). 
 5. Between 1953 and 1985, 54 percent of cases had accompanying published dissents. 
James L. Gibson, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, Phase II: 1953-1993 Terms 
(ICPSR Study No. 6987, 1997), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06987. Dissents 
appear to be on the rise. Between 1953 and 2000, the figure rose to two-thirds of cases. See LEE 
EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 
227–31 tbl.3-2 (2007). Professor Perry details another disincentive for publishing dissents from 
certiorari: Justices do not want the bar to know precisely why cases are granted or denied. 
PERRY, supra note 2, at 174. This stands in stark contrast to our theory here, but because we are 
attempting to explain some and not all dissents, both theories could be correct. 
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This type of dissent signals potential litigants about alternative 
routes to success. But to use this signaling effectively, the dissenting 
judge needs a cross-cutting issue that can split the existing majority. 
In this Article, we use federal-state disputes—which arise in a 
significant number of cases in every substantive policy area—as an 
example of such a cross-cutting issue. 
Although views on federal-state power may correlate with 
liberal-conservative division, a judge’s view on one may conflict with 
the other. For example, in Gonzales v. Raich,6 Justice O’Connor 
commented that she did not like California’s medical marijuana 
policy and would not have voted for it as a legislator, but to be 
consistent with her previous positions on states’ rights and restrictions 
on congressional power, she voted to uphold the legislation.7 On the 
other side of both issues, Justice Stevens said that Raich was one of 
the two decisions he most regretted having to make that Term,8 but 
that, to accord with his views of the broader federal-state principle, he 
had to rule against a policy he agreed with.9 
In this Article, we test our theory of judicial signaling by 
examining dissenting opinions that argue that the case should be 
decided on the basis of the proper balance of power between states 
and the federal government. To ensure that we are not confusing a 
majority-splitting mechanism with a substantive federal-state issue in 
the case, we look only at cases in which the dissent relies on federal-
state issues and the majority opinion does not mention federalism.10 
We show not only that such signals encourage more cases in the given 
substantive policy area, framed in terms of the balance of state and 
federal power, but also that this process is often successful: the 
 
 6. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 7. Id. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If I were a California citizen, I would not have 
voted for the medical marijuana ballot initiative; if I were a California legislator I would not 
have supported the Compassionate Use Act. But whatever the wisdom of California’s 
experiment with medical marijuana, the federalism principles that have driven our Commerce 
Clause cases require that room for experiment be protected in this case. For these reasons I 
dissent.”). 
 8. The other case was Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 9. In an address to the Clark County Bar Association, Justice Stevens stated: “I have no 
hesitation in telling you that I agree with the policy choice made by the millions of California 
voters.” John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Judicial Predilections, 
Address to the Clark County Bar Association (Aug. 18, 2005), in 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 4 (2005). But 
given the broader stakes for the power of Congress to regulate commerce, he added that “our 
duty to uphold the application of the federal statute was pellucidly clear.” Id. 
 10. This ensures that we are not confusing a signal from the majority opinion, or a non-
signal, when federalism is in fact a determinant of a case’s outcome. 
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previous dissenting coalition is more often subsequently in the 
majority. 
In other words, conservative dissents that mention that a case in 
a particular policy area should have been decided on the basis of 
federal-state power result in more decisions based on federal-state 
powers. Moreover, those cases are decidedly more conservative. The 
same is true with liberal Justices who mention federal-state powers in 
their dissents. Their dissents result in additional cases in the same 
policy area that are decided on the basis of federal-state powers, and 
those cases become measurably more liberal. 
This Article begins in Part I with case studies that illustrate how 
the signaling process works. It then develops a more general theory in 
Part II. In Part III, we test this theory using Supreme Court cases 
between the 1953 and 1985 Terms.11 We establish that an increase in 
dissents that mention federal-state power as the relevant issue when 
the majority does not rely on federalism causes an increase in future 
cases based on the balance of power between states and the federal 
government. Then, by estimating the change in the ideological 
placement between the initial set of cases in the policy area of the 
signal and the later cases in that policy area, we show that these 
dissenting signals actually transform past losses into subsequent 
majority victories. 
These results have important implications for how Justices can 
shape their own agendas by communicating indirectly with future 
litigants through their written opinions. The findings lay the 
groundwork for more research in the area of understanding written 
opinions as indications of Justices’ preferences and priorities. 
Research in this area can help the extrajudicial community shape the 
future of the Supreme Court’s agenda. We discuss these possibilities 
in the concluding Part IV. 
I.  CASE STUDIES 
In this Part, we provide a detailed case illustration in which a 
dissent based on federal-state power is transformed into a majority 
opinion in a subsequent permutation of the litigation. We then 
 
 11. We are limited to this time period because we use James Gibson’s Phase II Judicial 
Database, supra note 5, for information on whether the authors of case opinions make 
statements about whether federal or state powers are relevant to the opinion, for all majority, 
dissenting, and concurring opinions. Unfortunately, Gibson has not yet updated his database, 
but this limitation should not substantially affect our results. 
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provide some more brief case examples in which the same 
transformation occurs, but the subsequent litigation relates to new 
sets of facts. These examples show that the judicial signaling with 
which we are concerned can have a significant impact, in terms of 
both the relitigation of specific case facts and, more broadly, the 
development of doctrine. 
A. The Trees Beyond the Forest: Federalism Transforms Bacon’s 
Park 
Upon his death in 1911, U.S. Senator Augustus Bacon donated 
some land to the city of Macon, Georgia, to be used as a park for 
white people only. The estate was left to the care of seven white 
board members. In time, the city of Macon allowed blacks to use the 
park, and the Board sued the city.12 The city responded by giving up 
control of the park to a new set of private trustees, ensuring reversion 
to a policy of segregation in the park. Members of the black 
community intervened in the legal case, arguing that the city’s 
decision to give up control of the park violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas agreed: 
[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with 
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies 
or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional 
limitations . . . [T]he public character of this park requires that it be 
treated as a public institution subject to the command of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state 
law.13 
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the city had no right to transfer 
control of the park to a private authority that would then enforce 
segregation. 
Justice Black, dissenting, argued that the case did not have 
anything to do with racial discrimination, but was rather about states’ 
powers to enforce wills and trusts: 
I find nothing in the United States Constitution that compels any 
city or other state subdivision to hold title to property it does not 
want or to act as trustee under a will when it chooses not to do so. 
The State Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope and effect of 
this Georgia decree should be binding upon us unless the State 
 
 12. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 297 (1966). 
 13. Id. at 302. 
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Supreme Court has somehow lost its power to control and limit the 
scope and effect of Georgia trial court decrees relating to Georgia 
wills creating Georgia trusts of Georgia property. A holding that 
ignores this state power would be so destructive of our state judicial 
systems that it could find no support, we think, in our Federal 
Constitution or in any of this Court’s prior decisions.14 
Black further argued that the Court did not have the right to 
hear the case, as this decision should have been entirely within the 
providence of state powers and state courts.15 He labeled the ruling 
“revolutionary” in its effect on state court power over such matters.16 
Justice Douglas’s majority opinion did not consider the 
implications of the decision for the future of the state’s control over 
its wills and trusts, but the dissenting opinion raised the issue 
explicitly. Our argument is that in this case, intentionally or 
unintentionally, Justice Black’s dissenting opinion signaled for other 
potential litigants to explicitly frame future similar litigation in terms 
of its implications for states’ powers, as a way of undermining the 
existing majority coalition and potentially changing the outcome in 
future litigation. Moreover, by bringing up the fact that the state 
should not be compelled to act as the trustee of the will if it does not 
wish to hold title to the property,17 Black may have inspired the 
litigants in this specific case to sue for reinstatement of the property 
to the heirs. Indeed, new case facts that were more amenable to a 
decision favoring states’ rights actually did arise. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision, the Georgia Supreme Court 
suggested that it no longer had any right to maintain segregation and 
simply invalidated the segregated portion of the will, maintaining its 
right to oversee and regulate the park.18 In response, Senator Bacon’s 
heirs sued for the reinstatement of the property to the Bacon estate. 
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the segregated nature of the 
park was an essential and inseparable part of Bacon’s will.19 Because 
the state could no longer be entrusted with that authority, the 
property ought to be reverted to Bacon’s heirs. The petitioners who 
wanted to maintain the city’s right to continue its ownership and 
 
 14. Id. at 312 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id. at 313. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 312. 
 18. Evans v. Newton, 148 S.E.2d 329, 330 (Ga. 1966). 
 19. Evans v. Abney, 165 S.E.2d 160, 163–64 (Ga. 1968). 
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policy of desegregation of the park, along with the Attorney General 
of Georgia, brought the case on appeal.20 
By the time the appeal reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Burger had joined the Court; but this change in personnel only 
provided one extra vote to the three-judge minority. A majority 
nevertheless formed in support of the previously losing side when 
Justice White became convinced by the implications of states’ powers 
in the new case. The three-member dissent in Evans v. Newton21 
became a five-member majority in Evans v. Abney.22 Writing for the 
new majority, Justice Black stated plainly, as he did in his previous 
dissenting opinion, “We are of the opinion that in ruling as they did 
the Georgia courts did no more than apply well-settled general 
principles of Georgia law to determine the meaning and effect of a 
Georgia will.”23 
Stated simply, an initial majority opinion was based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment; only the dissent suggested that the debate 
ought to be about state police powers to regulate wills and estates. 
Although only one judge of the original 6–3 majority left the Court, 
the initial dissenting opinion became the majority in the second case. 
The actions that followed the Supreme Court’s decision—namely, the 
heirs’ decision to sue for recovery of the land—resulted in new case 
facts that allowed new litigation to be framed according to states’ 
powers rather than equal protection, as the dissent had suggested 
with its signal. The new case was no longer about racial segregation in 
a public park because there was no longer a public park; it was 
privately owned land. Rather than seeing the park desegregated 
against Bacon’s wishes, the trustees of Bacon’s will got what they 
wanted—control over the land. Moreover, the dissenting Supreme 
Court Justices in Evans v. Newton also got what they wanted—a case 
framed in such a way to persuade colleagues from the previous 
majority to join them and form a new majority. 
In this example, the subsequent case concerns the same dispute 
and litigants as the initial case, with newly manipulated case facts that 
enable litigants to make legal arguments that are amenable to a 
decision based on state powers. The dissenting minority was 
successful in inspiring the litigants to reframe the case facts and 
 
 20. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 437 (1970). 
 21. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
 22. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). 
 23. Id. at 440. 
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therefore the legal issue, garnering a new majority. As the next 
section shows, however, this reframing power is not limited to 
relitigation of a particularized dispute. 
B. Beyond Relitigation: Developing Doctrine in Subsequent 
Litigation 
We argue that dissents in a particular policy area can have an 
impact on cases that are entirely separate from the original case. A 
dissenting opinion regarding race discrimination could impact the way 
lawyers decide to frame a case regarding gender discrimination. A 
dissenting opinion in a case about obscenity and federal-state powers 
could impact the framing of a free exercise case. A dissenting opinion 
regarding the right to counsel could inspire the framing of a prisoner’s 
rights case. Thus, though the dissent may have to do with one specific 
set of case facts, it could have an impact on how litigants choose to 
frame many different cases within the same policy area. 
We found numerous examples in which the majority in an initial 
case ignored federalism issues and a Justice dissented on the ground 
of federal-state relations, whereas the majority in a later case referred 
approvingly to the initial dissent and accepted that dissent’s position. 
We provide a brief outline of three such pairs of cases to illustrate our 
theory. These illustrations, however, are only suggestive of a 
relationship between the two cases. Our empirical analysis in Part III 
explores whether these effects are idiosyncratic or systematic. 
One example can be found in a technical res judicata case, 
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,24 which concerned an 
allegation of price fixing in women’s clothing.25 In Moitie, the majority 
dismissed an antitrust appeal that had been removed from state to 
federal court on the basis of res judicata, refusing to find an equitable 
exception on the basis of “public policy and simple Justice.”26 Justice 
Brennan dissented, expressing the view that under settled principles 
of federal jurisdiction, the claims refiled in state court should not have 
been removed to federal court in the first place.27 Only his dissent 
focused on state-federal issues. In 1987, the majority opinion in 
 
 24. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981). 
 25. Id. at 394. 
 26. Id. at 398 (“A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their 
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.”). 
 27. Id. at 406 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“An action arising under state law may not be 
removed solely because a federal right or immunity is raised as a defense.”). 
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Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams28 found that breach of employment 
contract claims were improperly removed from state courts to federal 
courts.29 Explicitly citing the Moitie dissent, the opinion laid out strict 
requirements under which cases can be properly removed from state 
courts and forced into federal courts.30 
Both the case facts and the cases’ timing support our theory. The 
first case occurred six years before the follow-up case. In Part III, 
infra, we establish that it takes approximately four to six years for 
new cases to reach the Supreme Court, and thus we expect the effect 
of these dissenting signals to appear in cases four to six years after an 
initial dissent mentioning federal-state issues. 
A second example concerns preemption.31 In Motor Coach 
Employees v. Lockridge,32 a challenge to a union’s firing of an 
employee for not paying his dues failed because of preemption, as the 
National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction.33 The 
majority stated that “nothing could serve more fully to defeat the 
congressional goals underlying the Act than to subject, without 
limitation, the relationships it seeks to create to the concurrent 
jurisdiction of state and federal courts free to apply the general local 
law.”34 Justice White dissented on the ground that the question was 
not simply one of state and federal court jurisdiction.35 Rather, state 
laws should apply when federal legislation arguably does not apply, 
and so state courts should not be foreclosed from granting relief to 
union members under those state laws.36 Justice White stated: 
 
 28. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987). 
 29. Id. at 399. 
 30. Id. at 397 (“Caterpillar does not seek to point out that the contract relied upon by 
respondents is in fact a collective agreement; rather it attempts to justify removal on the basis of 
facts not alleged in the complaint. The ‘artful pleading’ doctrine cannot be invoked in such 
circumstances.” (citing Moitie, 452 U.S. at 410 (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
 31. Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 
274, 276 (1971) (“[The] National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state and federal court 
jurisdiction to remedy conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the Act.”). 
 32. Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 
274 (1971). 
 33. Id. at 302; see also id. at 276. 
 34. Id. at 287. 
 35. Id. at 309 (White, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 309 (“I could not join the opinion of the Court since it unqualifiedly applies the 
same doctrine where the conduct of the union is only arguably protected under the federal 
law.”). 
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By making the matter one of state law, Congress has not only 
authorized multiformity on the subject, but practically guaranteed 
it. . . . [Section] 14 (b) of NLRA . . . has authorized States to choose 
for themselves whether to require or permit union shops. This 
allows the States to regulate union or agency shop clauses, so that 
union insistence on a security agreement as part of a collective 
bargaining agreement may be prohibited in one State and protected 
or even encouraged in another.37 
Subsequently, in Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International 
Union v. Mobil Oil Corp.,38 a Court majority endorsed Justice White’s 
approach by upholding a collective bargaining agreement involving a 
union.39 The Court specified that although the National Labor 
Relations Act 
articulates a national policy that certain union-security agreements 
are valid as a matter of federal law, § 14 (b) reflects Congress’ 
decision that any State or Territory that wishes to may exempt itself 
from that policy. . . .We have recognized that with respect to those 
state laws which § 14 (b) permits to be exempted from § 8 (a)(3)’s 
national policy “[t]here is . . . conflict between state and federal law; 
but it is a conflict sanctioned by Congress with directions to give the 
right of way to state laws . . . .”40 
The first case was five years prior to the follow-up case. 
A final illustration in which a dissent had an impact on future 
litigation—both within the same issue area, as well as in adjacent 
issue areas—is A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,41 in which 
Justice Harlan dissented from a majority opinion that disallowed state 
regulations of certain allegedly obscene materials.42 The majority 
rejected the state’s treatment of the obscene materials as contraband 
that could automatically be seized and destroyed, like illegal liquor.43 
The majority reasoned that written materials receive greater 
protection than other illicit goods by virtue of the First Amendment, 
 
 37. Id. at 317–18 (citations omitted). 
 38. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976). 
 39. Id. at 416–17. 
 40. Id. (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). Note, however, 
that in this case, Texas’s statute did not satisfy § 14(b) “because most of the employees’ work is 
done on the high seas, outside the territorial bounds of the State of Texas, [and so] Texas’ right-
to-work laws cannot govern the validity of the agency-shop provision at issue here.” Id. at 420. 
 41. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964). 
 42. Id. at 215 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 211 (majority opinion). 
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and so procedures controlling written material must be “searching” to 
avoid suppression of protected speech.44 Justice Harlan said that the 
majority opinion “serves unnecessarily to handicap the States in their 
efforts to curb the dissemination of obscene material.”45 That year, 
Justice Harlan also dissented in Jacobellis v. Ohio,46 saying that the 
states were afforded more latitude to ban “any material which, taken 
as a whole, has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to 
treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally 
established criteria for judging such material.”47 
The subsequent explosion in obscenity litigation eventually 
resulted in Miller v. California,48 which put the regulation of obscene 
materials mostly into the hands of the state.49 The same year, in Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,50 the majority approvingly cited multiple 
dissents by Justice Harlan51 and adopted his overall approach of 
giving the states great latitude in these matters.52 The Court’s 
exposition on the law began: “It should be clear from the outset that 
we do not undertake to tell the States what they must do, but rather 
to define the area in which they may chart their own course in dealing 
with obscene material.”53 The majority emphasized that there are 
numerous legitimate state interests at stake in “stemming the tide of 
commercialized obscenity,”54 and that the Court must give deference 
 
 44. Id. at 212 (“[The] use of these warrants implicates questions whether the procedures 
leading to their issuance and surrounding their execution were adequate to avoid suppression of 
constitutionally protected publications.”). 
 45. Id. at 215 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 46. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 47. Id. at 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 48. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 49. Id. at 19 (“[T]he States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or 
exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant 
danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.”). 
 50. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 60. 
 52. Id. at 80 (“Mr. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, believed that the Federal 
Government in the exercise of its enumerated powers could control the distribution of ‘hard 
core’ pornography, while the States were afforded more latitude to ‘[ban] any material which, 
taken as a whole, has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat with sex in a 
fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally established criteria for judging such 
material.’” (quoting Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (citing Ginzburg v. 
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); A Quantity of Copies of Books 
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
496 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 53. Id. at 54. 
 54. Id. at 57. 
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to a state’s determination that obscenity is harmful to the public.55 
The Court’s attempts to articulate a national standard to the 
regulation of obscenity had proved unworkable, and Justice Harlan’s 
approach to treating the issue as one of respecting state-federal 
division provided the Court with a means of avoiding many of these 
intractable disputes.56 
Jacobellis and A Quantity of Copies of Books may have resulted 
in additional cases regarding issue areas outside of obscenity. In the 
years following these decisions, the Court heard a variety of First 
Amendment cases that invoked the question of the balance of power 
between the federal government and the states. One example is Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,57 in which the Court found that “the States 
should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal 
remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a 
private individual.”58 This finding is consistent with Justice Harlan’s 
dissenting opinions in the obscenity cases. 
These illustrations suggest that dissents based on federal-state 
issues can effectively serve as signals for future litigation, and that this 
may provide the dissenting Justices with cases that allow them to form 
alternate majorities in subsequent cases. This raises three questions: 
First, why would this strategy be successful? Second, are these 
illustrations aberrations, or is there a significant and consistent 
pattern in this phenomenon? Third, if there is a pattern, does it work 
for both liberal and conservative initial dissents? The following Part 
provides a theory of judicial signaling to answer the first question, and 
then our empirical analysis addresses the second and third questions. 
II.  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL SIGNALING 
Bacon’s case is an example of relitigation by the same plaintiffs 
to achieve a different outcome, but as our other historical illustrations 
suggest, signaling can have value beyond relitigation. Potential 
litigants can look to signals coming out of a wide variety of cases in 
 
 55. Id. at 60–61 (“Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial 
behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably determine that 
such a connection does or might exist.”). 
 56. Id. at 64 (“The States, of course, may follow such a ‘laissez-faire’ policy and drop all 
controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is what they prefer, just as they can ignore 
consumer protection in the marketplace, but nothing in the Constitution compels the States to 
do so with regard to matters falling within state jurisdiction.”). 
 57. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 58. Id. at 345–46. 
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the same policy area, and decide which arguments to emphasize. 
Bacon’s case illustrates that even in relation to the same controversy, 
litigants can sometimes generate new case facts when they interpret 
the dissent as a signal to frame future litigation according to federal 
versus state powers. More typically, we expect subsequent cases to 
occur a number of years after the initial case because the alternative 
approach to the issue area will generally require new case facts. This 
Part first spells out the assumptions our theory is based on, and then 
provides more detail on the theory itself. 
A. Assumptions 
Our theory hinges on the truth of six assumptions about judicial 
behavior. The first group of three assumptions about the policy 
preferences of Justices is now fairly uncontroversial, as they have 
been well established in empirical legal and political science 
literatures. We briefly outline the literature substantiating each of 
these assumptions. The second group of three assumptions is more 
controversial, and we address their plausibility and impact. 
1. Justices’ Policy Preferences and Strategic Behavior.  First, the 
notion of signaling implicitly presumes that Justices have priorities 
and preferences about case dispositions, and act in ways that are 
consistent with those preferences. Whereas at one time this position 
may have been controversial, these days it is fairly well established. 
For example, an extensive empirical literature exists that shows that 
Justices vote strategically over certiorari, to ensure both that the 
Court hears the sort of cases the Justices are interested in and that it 
does not hear cases that will set a precedent contrary to each Justice’s 
preferences.59 
In a comprehensive study using judicial records and some of the 
Justices’ private papers, Professors Epstein and Knight examined 
judicial notes and letters that reveal Justices engaging in negotiation 
and bargaining with one another.60 Epstein and Knight also compared 
early and late drafts of opinions, and compared Justices’ initial 
 
 59. See, e.g., Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic 
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824, 
825–26 (1995); Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated 
Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 passim (1999); Kevin 
T. McGuire & Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: 
Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 717, 717–18 (1993). 
 60. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 73–76. 
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conference votes to their final case positions.61 They uncovered 
evidence of three types of strategic activities. First, Justices undertake 
bargaining with one another—over certiorari, policy at the merit 
stage, and opinion writing.62 Second, Justices engage in “forward 
thinking,” which includes: considering the expected behavior of 
external actors; defensive denials, or refusing to take a case the 
Justice may wish to hear out of an expectation the Justice will be 
unable to garner majority support; and aggressive grants, or taking a 
case that may not warrant review because the Justice calculates that it 
may be good for developing a doctrine.63 Forward thinking also 
includes manipulating the agenda, particularly at conference.64 Third, 
Justices write sophisticated opinions, which attempt to win over 
ambivalent colleagues.65 Epstein and Knight’s work provides ample 
evidence that Justices have preferences about case outcomes, and that 
overall they act consistently with those preferences. 
Second, for signaling to be an effective strategy, Justices must 
have enough information about their colleagues’ preferences to 
enable them to know what kinds of arguments would be likely to 
persuade their colleagues to join them.66 Justices have the benefit of 
conference discussion and less formal interactions with their 
 
 61. Id. at 90–98, 99–105 tbl.3-6. 
 62. Id. at 58–79. 
 63. Id. at 79–88. 
 64. Id. at 88–95. 
 65. Id. at 95–111. See generally FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. 
WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000) 
(highlighting the extent to which strategic interactions among the Justices shape the Court’s 
opinions). But see Boucher & Segal, supra note 59, at 829 (finding evidence for aggressive grants 
but not for defensive denials, and theorizing and finding that a decision to grant certiorari is a 
function of a desire to reverse, the support the Justice expects from the rest of the Court, and an 
interaction between these two variables). Professors Boucher and Segal find that the extent of 
strategic behavior varies by individual Justice. Id.; see also PERRY, supra note 2, at 276 (“It was 
clear that strategic considerations tended to be the exception rather than the rule for all of the 
justices, though some justices were clearly strategic more often than others.”). 
 66. This is a fairly standard assumption that scholars studying the courts make. See, e.g., 
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United 
States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 420 (2002). Some 
scholars, however, assume the opposite. E.g., Lawrence Baum, Policy Goals in Judicial 
Gatekeeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary Jurisdiction, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 13, 17 (1977). 
One of the few studies to challenge this notion is John F. Krol & Saul Brenner, Strategies in 
Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335, 338 
(1990), but arguably their results actually support the hypothesis that judges consider their 
colleagues’ likely actions. Of the three hypotheses relating to this topic that they test, the 
evidence supports two, and the one the evidence does not support relates to predicting the 
behavior of uncertain judges only. 
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colleagues to develop private knowledge of their proclivities. 
Although this evidence is necessarily indirect, a number of studies 
have provided evidence that the Justices have foreknowledge of their 
colleagues’ future outcomes.67 For instance, studies have found that 
judicial decisions depend on the level of support judges expect from 
other members of the court,68 implying some level of foreknowledge.69 
These findings show both that judges can accurately anticipate their 
colleagues’ likely actions and that judges’ own actions vary with the 
likelihood that they will cast the pivotal vote. 
Third, the theory of judicial signaling to litigants must implicitly 
assume that litigants want to win and will use whatever arguments 
they believe will help them win, and that their lawyers use 
information from Justices’ written opinions to gauge which case facts 
and legal arguments will appeal to which Justices. This assumption is 
also established in the political science literature.70 For instance, 
scholars have shown that both organized interests and professional 
bars shape judicial agendas by drawing Justices’ attention to cases 
with a potentially large impact on public policy.71 
2. Litigants, Their Access to Cases, and the Timing of Litigation.  
Thus, these three core assumptions about strategic judicial behavior 
are well established. There are other aspects of our theory of judicial 
signaling, however, that may be more controversial. First, for the 
process to work systematically, there must be a sufficient number of 
sophisticated litigants who pay attention to signals so that opinions in 
cases with one issue can successfully summon cases in other issue 
areas within the same broad policy area. Second, litigants must have 
access to a wide variety of cases with a wide variety of case facts, 
some of which lend themselves to appropriate legal arguments that 
are likely to appeal to the Justices. Third, because, as we show in 
Section B, this effect takes several years, Justices must be willing to 
wait to hear cases that are not already in the litigation pipeline—
 
 67. See Caldeira et al., supra note 59; Epstein et al., supra note 66. 
 68. See, e.g., Boucher & Segal, supra note 59, at 832. 
 69. Saul Brenner, The New Certiorari Game, 41 J. POL. 649, 651 (1979) (“Justices can be 
expected to calculate with a high degree of accuracy for they have the motivation, ability, and 
opportunity to do so.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in 
the Supreme Court, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807, 828–29 (1990) (showing that the filing of amicus 
briefs greatly increases the odds that the Court will grant certiorari). 
 71. See McGuire & Caldeira, supra note 59, at 724. 
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because high-quality cases, framed in a way that Justices would like to 
see them framed, are relatively rare and are therefore worth waiting 
for. 
To defend the two assumptions relating to strategic litigant 
activity, we drew evidence from personal interviews with directors of 
interest groups who support litigation. In 2001, the Colorado Legal 
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stated that 
the Colorado branch receives ten thousand calls a year from people 
who claim that their rights or liberties have been violated.72 Of those 
ten thousand, two thousand are serious violations. If this is true of all 
fifty state ACLUs, and given the number of other groups and law 
firms that support litigation, then there is a great deal of access to a 
high number of quality cases from which to choose.73 The ACLU 
Board meets often to discuss which of those two thousand cases are 
worthy of ACLU support. In an interview with Steven Shapiro, the 
Legal Director of the National ACLU, Shapiro claimed that the 
ACLU supports over a thousand cases at any one time.74 Thus, there 
are probably a sufficient number of controversies so that these groups 
or law firms serve as a form of litigation triage. Whereas triage in an 
emergency room prioritizes the worst cases, litigation triage 
prioritizes the cases that are most likely to lend themselves to legal 
arguments that will balance the preference for legal change with a 
preference for winning. As this process occurs, Justices receive high 
quality cases that allow them to act in a way consistent with their own 
priorities and preferences, given the preferences of their colleagues 
(or at least four other colleagues). 
The third of these more controversial assumptions has not been 
proven in the political science literature. Although many authors have 
recognized that judges act strategically, they have largely studied 
short-term strategy: how judges ensure their favored outcome in any 
given case. For most studies, an assumption of short-term judicial 
focus is implicit;75 for others it is explicit.76 But there is no reason to 
 
 72. Interview with Simon Mole, Intake Dir., Colorado ACLU, in Denver, Colo. (May 6, 
2001) (on file with author). 
 73. On the role of other interest group–based litigation, see VANESSA A. BAIRD, 
ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME 
COURT AGENDA 46–48 (2007). 
 74. Interview with Steven Shapiro, Legal Dir., National ACLU, in N.Y., N.Y. (May 18, 
2001) (on file with author). 
 75. Baum, supra note 66, at 16. 
 76. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 18. 
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assume that judges have such a myopic focus, particularly those with 
lifetime tenure. Judges may seek to have the capacity to set the law of 
the land (or state or region), and thus may be willing to sacrifice their 
preferred outcome in a given case to find a better vehicle to direct the 
development of the law. 
Just as the political science literature has shown that Justices are 
strategic, we consider that they are likely to have a long-term as well 
as a short-term focus. We also believe that litigants as a whole are 
likely to act strategically, even if any given individual may be less 
sophisticated. Ultimately, if we are wrong in these assumptions, then 
we should not find the effect we hypothesize. 
B. Formalizing a Theory of Judicial Signaling 
In this Section, we clarify all aspects of our theory explicitly. 
First, we describe the theory in detail. Then, we present empirical 
evidence that helps bolster our expected time lags between the signals 
and the resulting cases. Third, we explain how issue agendas are 
transformed to a dimension dealing with federal and state powers. 
1. Description of Signaling Theory.  Our theory is akin to Riker’s 
theory of “heresthetics,” a word Riker created from the Greek root 
meaning “choosing or electing.”77 A heresthetical maneuver involves 
an actor who sets the agenda by choosing a question strategically to 
generate supportive majority coalitions for a particular outcome, even 
when the majority may not seem supportive when the discussion is 
framed on another dimension. The agenda setter manipulates the 
substance of the proposal from one dimension to another, 
transforming a minority coalition into a majority coalition.78 
Justices’ dissents often argue that the Court should have decided 
a case according to a different legal rationale. Likeminded future 
litigants can interpret legal rationales in dissenting opinions as 
information about how they might reconstruct the case facts and legal 
arguments to be more likely to win on the merits in the future. We 
argue that these dissenting opinions could have an impact on a wide 
variety of issues in the same policy area. For example, if a dissenting 
opinion on the issue of libel says that the states should have a wider 
ability to regulate these matters, the dissent will have an impact on 
litigants who are considering other legal questions associated with the 
 
 77. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION, at ix (1986). 
 78. Id. at 1. 
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First Amendment. Litigants have an incentive to use all available 
information—and although dissenting signals may need to be assessed 
with skepticism, they can be informative for litigants deciding how to 
frame future cases.79 
It is not essential for us to ascertain whether a Justice intended to 
signal for future cases. What is vital is that we can ascertain Justices’ 
preferences and then show that litigants use that information to 
create outcomes that are in line with those preferences. Whether 
Justices know or intend that this will happen is less important than 
showing that dissenting Justices get what they want: a chance to be in 
the majority when they were previously in the minority. 
In this Article, we look at dissenting opinions in cases 
representing a wide variety of policy areas. We look specifically at 
dissenting opinions that mention that the Court should not have 
decided the case the way it did because of rules about the state and 
federal balance of power. The policy areas include First Amendment, 
discrimination, privacy, criminal rights and procedure, labor and 
labor union issues, the environment, economic regulation, taxation, 
due process and government liability, judicial power, and federalism. 
We consider only dissenting opinions that mention federalism when 
the majority opinion does not mention federalism, which we refer to 
as “federalism dissents.” This way, we can focus exclusively on the 
effect of the dissenting opinion. We examine whether signals have a 
systematic impact on the ideological placement of the Supreme 
Court’s policy outputs in future cases that are framed in terms of 
federalism. Can a conservative dissenting coalition become a majority 
coalition in future cases in the same policy areas when the cases are 
framed in terms of the balance of state and federal power? Do liberal 
dissenting opinions have a similar impact? 
Past research bolsters our claim that there is indeed a systematic 
effect. Strategic litigants bring litigation with the Court’s policy 
priorities in mind.80 Moreover, they bring litigation that is framed in a 
way that will appeal to the marginal or swing Justice on a given 
issue.81 Studies have shown that the lag time in new cases reaching the 
 
 79. See Tonja Jacobi, The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets, 16 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 11–13 (2008) (discussing the signaling interaction between judges and 
litigants). 
 80. See Vanessa A. Baird, The Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Agenda, 66 J. POL. 755, 756 (2004). 
 81. See BAIRD, supra note 73, at 149 (“[T]he strategy is to figure out a way to appeal to the 
tie-breaker, or the justices that are ideologically in the center.”). 
BAIRD-JACOBI IN FINAL.DOC 10/6/2009  6:28:09 PM 
2009] HOW THE DISSENT BECOMES THE MAJORITY 203 
Supreme Court in response to the Court’s signals is approximately 
five years.82 
This theory relies on two specific assertions. One is the issue of 
litigation timing. Sending a signal to inspire litigants to bring issues 
that are based on federal-state powers will require some number of 
years. Here we rely on previous empirical research that looks at the 
timing of the effect of signals on future litigation. Secondly, our 
theory relies on the idea that when litigants present Justices with new 
case facts in which the balance of federal-state powers is the dominant 
issue, they can persuade Justices to vote a different way. The 
following two sections provide evidence of these two effects. 
2. The Litigation Time Lag.  Why do we expect this level of time 
lag? We can form a rough estimate of the time lag we should expect 
by looking at statistics on the time interval between filing at the 
district court level and disposition at the Supreme Court. According 
to the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics provided by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the median time 
interval between filing and disposition of civil cases in U.S. district 
courts for the period ending on September 30, 2004, is 21.1 months.83 
The median time interval between filing notice of appeal and 
disposition in the U.S. courts of appeals is 10.5 months.84 
Unfortunately, the Administrative Office does not provide similar 
figures for the additional interval between Supreme Court filing and 
disposition, so we cannot be sure of the cumulative total for 
disposition. But we would anticipate a somewhat similar time interval 
between Supreme Court filing and disposition, suggesting an 
approximate time frame of four years. We may, however, expect a 
longer delay in cases generated in response to signals, as this requires 
a case-generating controversy. This delay may be even longer for 
cases generated in response to federalism signals, as the relevant 
initiating action is some governmental action, such as the passage of 
legislation. Thus, we expect that dissenting signals will generate new 
cases with new case facts in the given policy area sometime in the 
following four to six years. 
 
 82. Id. at 69. 
 83. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 162 tbl.C-5 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/c5.pdf. 
 84. Id. at 97 tbl.B-4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b4.pdf. 
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Our first step, then, is to ascertain whether there are cycles of 
Supreme Court attention to certain issues. This determination will not 
establish a signaling effect, but it will be an important initial element 
of our analysis. We did this first by examining one particular policy 
area over time, in Figure 1, and then we generalized this examination 
to all policy areas, in Table 1. 
Figure 1.  Attention to Criminals’ Rights Cases at the Supreme 
Court, 1953–2000 
A look at the historical trend of the Supreme Court’s attention to 
criminal cases serves to illustrate the signaling effect in the timing of 
litigation. Figure 1 presents the number of cases that the Supreme 
Court heard dealing with criminals’ rights cases from 1953 through 
2000. The x-axis is the Term of the Court; the y-axis is the number of 
cases the Court hears. The years in which there are a significantly 
higher number of cases than previous years are shaded. These years 
are 1957, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1989, 1992, and 
1997. 
The interesting aspect of this figure is that in no year except one, 
during which there was a high yield, does the caseload remain as high 
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in the subsequent year. Except for the years 1971 and 1972, when 
there are a high number of cases, the caseload drops in the following 
two to five years. It then reaches another spike. This informal look at 
the data gives the impression that there are increases in the attention 
to criminal cases every three to six years. A time-series analysis that 
looks at the effect of important cases on the number of future cases 
reveals that on average, in criminal cases, the cycle is four years.85 
Figure 1 does not prove the signaling effects that we theorize, but 
it does indicate that the kind of trend we expect to arise if signaling 
occurs does exist—at least in relation to criminal rights. Table 1 shows 
that this effect is not confined to criminal rights cases; it reports a 
similar effect in the average time lag for all other Supreme Court 
policy areas. In every policy area on the Court’s agenda, the attention 
cycle ranges from three to six years. 
Table 1.  Average Time Lag of the Effect of Important Decisions 
on Future Supreme Court Agenda Attention 
Policy Area Average Cycle of Supreme 
Court Agenda Attention 
Discrimination 3 to 6 years 
First Amendment 3 to 4 years 
Privacy 3 years 
Criminal Rights 4 years 
Labor 3 years 
Environment 3 to 5 years 
Economic Regulation 4 years 
Taxation 6 years 
Due Process and Government Liability 5 years 
Judicial Power 5 years 
Note: These policy area categories match Spaeth’s coding of “Value” from the United 
States Supreme Court Judicial Database fairly closely, with a few exceptions: the separation of 
environmental cases into their own category, the inclusion of personal injury and government 
 
 85. See Baird, supra note 80, at 764. The time-series analysis reported here looks at the 
effect of an index measuring “important” decisions on the future caseload of cases in that policy 
area. We used a simple Prais-Winsten regression. Important cases are measured by counting the 
number of cases that are reported on the front page of the New York Times, see Lee Epstein & 
Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 (2000); declarations of 
unconstitutionality; cases that formally reverse precedent; and the proportion of cases that 
reverse lower court decisions. Each indicator is standardized on a scale of 0 to 1 and is then 
summed. This index is meant to indicate signals from the Court that at least some subset of 
Justices considers this policy area a priority. This analysis appears in more detail in Baird, supra 
note 80, at 759–62. 
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liability with noncriminal due process cases, and the inclusion of state and federal taxation into 
the same category. Furthermore, miscellaneous and attorney law issues are excluded from the 
analysis. 
Phase II of the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database codes every opinion for 
whether the case’s topic involves the balance of power between the states and the federal 
government. Moreover, every opinion is coded for whether it expands or restricts the powers of 
the states or the federal government in relation to one another. The presence of federalism is 
coded positively when the topic is the balance of power or when the value either expands or 
restricts federal or state power. 
All orally argued cases, whether they resulted in signed or unsigned opinions, including 
per curium decisions and judgments, are counted. Memoranda, decrees, multiple docket 
numbers, and any case that resulted in a split vote are excluded. Some case citations represent 
multiple issues. When these issues span across different policy areas, they are counted once for 
each issue represented; otherwise, they are counted only once. 
The implication of Table 1 is that when Justices indicate—by 
deciding to focus their agenda on a particular area of jurisprudence—
that they consider a particular area a priority, the Court does not 
immediately pursue additional cases in that area in subsequent years. 
After the Court’s initial flurry of activity in a certain policy area, 
there is a lag of three to six years before the Court puts additional 
cases in that policy area on the agenda. It seems that if Justices 
consider a certain policy area a priority in one year, they would 
consider it a priority in the following year. So why wait? 
The answer we find most appealing is that they are waiting for 
the most appropriate case vehicles.86 When litigants—or interest 
groups or other political actors interested in legal change—perceive 
that a particular policy is a priority, they begin to scour the universe 
for appropriate cases. As with our ACLU example, litigants are most 
likely to pick cases that respond specifically to legal arguments in 
previous cases. The cases then take three to five years in the litigation 
pipeline before the Supreme Court hears them. Seemingly, the Court 
depends on litigants to respond to what the Justices are saying in their 
cases, and this process tends to take three to six years. 
But why do Justices need to signal for cases in the future? If the 
Justices did not need new case facts, they could simply transform the 
issue in the initial case into one involving federalism, without needing 
new litigation. There are instances when Justices can manipulate the 
issues without waiting for litigants to frame new cases appropriately. 
Professors Epstein and Shvetsova note examples of this, showing that 
the Chief Justice can have some impact on which issues are taken into 
consideration on the merits.87 Moreover, Professors Ulmer88 and 
 
 86. On the weight that Justices give to finding an appropriate vehicle to develop an area of 
the law, see PERRY, supra note 2, at 234. 
 87. See Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme 
Court, 14 J. THEORETICAL POL. 93, 104–13 (2002). 
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McGuire and Palmer89 provide evidence that Justices, because they 
prefer some issues over others, create issues that were not presented 
before them—a phenomenon called “issue fluidity,” whereby Justices 
address legal questions in their opinions that were not presented in 
the legal briefs.90 
The response to this counterargument is that Justices may not 
always be as willing or able to address issues that the litigants did not 
present. Professors Epstein, Segal, and Johnson argue that some 
Justices consider issue fluidity inappropriate; it violates a norm they 
consider important.91 By the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, it 
has a well-developed record that is often difficult to ignore. In fact, 
even before a sympathetic judge, an outcome may depend not simply 
on the fact that a litigant makes a federalism argument, but may 
require a particular form of that argument. Because litigants need to 
choose carefully the arguments they make before the Court—due to 
opportunity costs created by time constraints and judicial impatience 
with litigants who throw every possible argument into a brief—
effective signaling will often require new litigation, and will not be 
amenable to fact or issue manipulation. 
Holding all else equal, Justices are likely to prefer cases with 
facts amenable to particular legal arguments, rather than cases in 
which they have to create the issue themselves. And if the initial case 
facts do not lend themselves to being framed on the basis of federal-
state power, the Justices will require new case facts to generate 
different legal arguments. In this situation, litigants have an incentive 
to find (or create) new case facts and bring new litigation that allows 
dissenting Justices to persuade their previously unsympathetic 
colleagues to join them in their opinion. 
Signaling provides a means of finding appropriate legal vehicles 
with appropriate case facts and appropriate parties in the policy areas 
that Justices want to influence, thus allowing them to maximize their 
 
 88. See S. Sidney Ulmer, Issue Fluidity in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Conceptual Analysis, 
in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 319, 322 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. 
Lamb eds., 1982). 
 89. See Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 691 (1995). 
 90. See id.; Ulmer, supra note 88, at 322. 
 91. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Timothy Johnson, The Claim of Issue Creation on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845, 845 (1996) (“[T]he sua sponte doctrine, 
namely, the practice disfavoring the creation of issues not raised in the record before the Court, 
is a norm.”). 
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policymaking power while minimizing their need to violate judicial 
norms. Litigants facing analogous but unrelated circumstances can 
benefit from judicial signals of how best to argue their case. The 
implication of our theory is that Justices benefit from litigants’ 
interpretation of their written opinions. Litigants aid Justices by 
interpreting their signals and bringing them cases that better enable 
them to persuade their colleagues to vote with them. 
3. Transforming the Issue Dimension of Judicial Decisionmaking.  
If litigants are responsive to judicial signals, what can dissenting 
Justices signal as a means of upsetting the existing majority on an 
issue? Our illustrations suggest that federal-state issues often cut 
across the various substantive legal issues, providing an alternative 
route to deciding the case. Consistent with this, Table 2, infra, shows 
that federalism arguments appear in majority opinions across all 
policy areas. Questions of federal-state power are not raised in every 
case, but they do cross every broad policy area the Supreme Court 
addresses and arise in a significant number of cases. 
Figure 2 shows the overall preference positions of the Roberts 
Court using Martin-Quinn measures92 of judicial positioning in the 
2008 Term along a unidimensional liberal-conservative scale. The 
process by which the Martin-Quinn scores are calculated is discussed 
infra in Part III. For the moment, it is enough to know that one way 
of summarizing judicial preferences is along a single ideological 
dimension. 
Figure 2.  Judicial Preferences on the Roberts Court, 2008 Term 
 
Empirical judicial scholars have not yet proven whether the 
overwhelming bulk of decisionmaking for courts can be collapsed 
down to one dimension of liberalism versus conservatism without 
losing much explanatory power93—as it can be for Congress.94 This is 
 
 92. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). 
 93. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median 
Justice on the Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of “Natural 
Courts” 1953-1991, 112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 58 (2002) (noting that a single dimension 
explains much of the Justices’ voting behaviors). Some law scholars, however, take 
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an empirical question of great significance for the study of judicial 
behavior, but we need not decide it for our purposes. Even if much of 
judicial decisionmaking can be described in terms of one liberal-
conservative dimension, this does not mean that there cannot be 
cross-cutting issues in some cases. We do not dispute the possibility 
that much of judicial decisionmaking can be described 
unidimensionally. Indeed, our theory reinforces the idea that at 
times, Justices behave strategically by using other dimensions to 
persuade their colleagues to vote a different way so that they can 
achieve outcomes consistent with their pure policy objectives. Put 
another way, even if the liberal-conservative dimension is dominant, 
other factors can effectively divide majorities on some issues. 
Interpretive methodology or procedural issues could be factors; 
arguably, federalism is another. For example, Professors Spiller and 
Tiller model federalism as a second decisionmaking dimension, and 
find preliminary support for that view.95 It is this variation that we 
explain here. 
If only one dimension shapes all judicial decisions, then all case 
outcomes should look the same, regardless of the position of the 
underlying case facts or policy outcome if the Court does not reverse. 
The outcome will always be at the median Justice’s ideal point. We 
know that median Justices are typically the most important Justices 
on the Court, but Professors Epstein and Jacobi showed that some 
median Justices are much more powerful than others, and that 
 
issue with this idea. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms 
on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2320 (1999) (“It is frequently 
assumed that . . . the majority will converge in a moderate or median position. This 
may well be quite likely when the Justices’ ideal points can be lined up nicely in a single-
peaked fashion along a single dimension, for instance from liberal to 
conservative. . . . But sometimes the options under discussion cannot easily be 
aligned along a single dimension.”). 
 94. See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL–
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 229 (1997) (“The most recent 
Congresses are highly unidimensional, very polarized, and fit the spatial model 
extremely well.”); Keith T. Poole, Changing Minds? Not in Congress!, 131 PUB. 
CHOICE 435, 437 (2007) (reporting that voting in Congress is almost exclusively one-
dimensional, such that now “a single dimension accounts for about 92 percent of roll call 
voting”). 
 95. See generally Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: 
Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996) 
(modeling decisionmaking as a product of a substantive legal issue and federalism, and 
providing initial empirical evidence of some cases dividing Justices by these two dimensions). 
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weaker medians do not get their way in many cases, including many 
important ones.96 
Considering a second dimension presents the possibility of 
multiple alternative strategies. This provides an explanation of why 
dissenting opinions raise different issues.97 Judges on the losing side of 
an issue may seek to undermine the existing majority. Having lost on 
the substance of an issue, judges can look to an alternative basis—
federalism—to decide the case, potentially destabilizing the winning 
coalition. Figure 3 illustrates why. 
Figure 3 illustrates two possible positions of the three central 
Justices on the current Court. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Roberts 
are arrayed as in Figure 2, but with two different hypothesized 
positions on a federalism dimension (no equivalent score exists for 
judicial preferences in relation to federalism in particular). If judicial 
preferences vary by topic, as in Figure 3A, it is easy to see why 
different combinations of judges can form majorities, including 
majorities that exclude the median. If a case were decided on the 
substantive criminal rights issue in Figure 3A, Justice Kennedy could 
form a majority with Justice Roberts or Justice Breyer or both, but it 
would be unlikely that any majority would form without him. But if 
the case were decided on the basis of federalism, Justices Breyer and 
Roberts would be more likely to agree with each other than either 
Justice would with Justice Kennedy—and thus a different majority 
could form, potentially deciding the case in the opposite direction. 
Figure 3.  Possible Judicial Positioning in Two Dimensions 
Figure 3A.  Variation by Topic                                     Figure 3B.  Perfect Correlation 
 
 96. Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 73–89 (2008). 
 97. Scholars have struggled to provide a systematic theory of why judges publish dissents. 
See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 60–62. 
Federalism 
Criminal Rights 
Federalism 
Criminal Rights 
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If instead there is little difference between judicial views on the 
substantive issue of criminal rights and federalism, as illustrated in 
Figure 3B, different majorities could form as long as the underlying 
case facts facing the Justices do not always arise on the exact dividing 
line illustrated in Figure 3B.98 With two potential dimensions, every 
possible combination of judges can form a majority, and a majority 
always exists that can overturn any other majority.99 Thus, not only 
could Justices Breyer and Roberts agree on an outcome that Justice 
Kennedy disagreed with—as their purported federalism positions in 
Figure 3 indicate—but even Justices whose positions are extremely 
divided on most substantive issues, such as Justices Stevens and 
Scalia, could potentially agree on an outcome. For instance, in Raich, 
as we discussed, Justices Stevens and Scalia both decided in favor of 
the federal government—Justice Stevens’s subsequent statements 
suggest that he based his decision on federalism, whereas Justice 
Scalia’s vote is easier to reconcile with his views on the substantive 
issue, rather than with his position in previous cases regarding 
federalism.100 Consequently, some decisions made on the initial policy 
dimension can be overturned through the introduction of the second 
dimension. 
Thus, if a judge intends to dissent in a case, it may be beneficial 
to introduce a federalism argument that constitutes an alternative 
means of addressing the question. If litigants respond by bringing new 
cases based on that federalism argument, which then work their way 
through the judicial system in the next few years, a majority may exist 
to overturn the initial outcome. This does not require any personnel 
 
 98. Thus, even if federalism is purely a methodological means of reaching an outcome that 
each judge would prefer on the first dimension, different majorities nonetheless may form when 
only one dimension is at play. In fact, our empirical results show that federalism is not just a 
proxy for conservative ideology, but also results in liberal movements in outcomes. See infra 
Part III. 
 99. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46–60 (2d ed. 
1963); Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some 
Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 472 (1976); Norman Schofield, 
Transitivity of Preferences on a Smooth Manifold of Alternatives, 14 J. ECON. THEORY 149, 149 
(1977). 
 100. Justice Scalia joined the majority in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), both of which favored restrictions on the federal 
government and protection for traditional state activities. Justice Scalia’s overall ideological 
score, however, was a very conservative 2.736 in the 2008 Term, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. 
Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores, http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2009), 
which is compatible with the strong law and order substantive outcome that Raich enabled. 
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changes or ideological convergence of the Justices. It simply requires 
that the second dimension be salient to judicial decisionmaking. 
Our aim is not to identify the exact location of case outcomes in 
two-dimensional space, but rather to show the extent to which 
manipulation of the second dimension can change the outcome of a 
case in the first dimension. As long as judicial decisionmaking is 
affected by more than simply the left-right ideological policy 
continuum, this model explains why a dissent that relies on 
federalism, and signals the possibility of an alternative outcome on 
federalism grounds, can result in a majority favoring the original 
dissenter’s position. We now formalize the hypotheses of this theory 
and test them. 
III.  AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL SIGNALING 
In this Part, we statistically test the impact of dissenting signals 
on the ideological placement of subsequent Supreme Court cases 
across various policy areas from 1953 through 1985. Although our 
choice of case studies may be somewhat persuasive, we think that a 
large-scale empirical approach is essential to assessing whether the 
effect that these cases preliminarily identify is common or 
exceptional. The signals with which we are concerned are necessarily 
coded in the rarefied language of judicial propriety. Thus, this is a 
subtle phenomenon that can only be seen clearly in rare cases. Our 
case studies may be remarkable because the effects seem quite clear. 
Fortunately, we have empirical tools to conduct a broader analysis 
that allows us to ascertain whether our case studies are representative 
of a more systematic effect. 
There are three hypotheses in this analysis. Hypothesis 1 is that 
any dissenting opinion that raises the issue of federalism leads to an 
increase in the number of cases that are decided primarily on the 
basis of federalism. Hypothesis 2 is that conservative dissenting 
opinions that mention federalism lead to future majority opinions 
that are decided on the basis of federalism and move the Court’s 
ideological placement in a conservative direction. Hypothesis 3 
mirrors the ideological component of the second hypothesis: it 
proposes that liberal dissenting opinions that mention federalism lead 
to future majority opinions that are decided on the basis of federalism 
and move the Court’s ideological placement in a liberal direction. 
Before undertaking our analysis, we describe our data and forms 
of measurement—the empirical tools we use in this enterprise. We 
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then describe how we measure changes in overall case outcomes 
within a given area of the law, before providing our results. 
A. Methods 
1. Data.  Our second and third hypotheses test the effect of 
dissenting opinions only when the majority opinion does not mention 
federalism as a relevant dimension. This way, the tests can focus 
directly on the effect of the information contained in the dissenting 
opinion. Our units of analysis—that is, where we look for an impact 
of these federalism-based dissents—are each policy area for each 
Supreme Court Term from 1953 through 1985. 
The data used for this analysis are from Phase I and Phase II of 
the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database.101 Phase I codes 
all cases as belonging primarily in a particular issue. We use these 
issue codings to generate categories of policy areas.102 Phase II 
provides data on every majority and dissenting opinion for every case 
from 1953 through 1985. These data code all majority, dissenting, and 
concurring opinions for whether the opinions’ authors make 
statements about whether federal or state powers are relevant to the 
opinion.103 
Cases are coded for whether the opinion’s author mentions that 
the case expands or restricts the relative balance of federal and state 
powers. A case coded positively for addressing federalism is not 
precluded from being categorized as representing other topics or 
issues. Opinions within all policy areas can invoke the question of 
federal versus state powers.104 Figure 4 presents an example of 
 
 101. Gibson, supra note 5; Harold J. Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial 
Database, 1953–1997 Terms (ICPSR Study No. 9422, 1999), available at http://dx.doi.org/10. 
3886/ICPSR09422. 
 102. These policy area categories match Spaeth’s coding of “Value” from the United States 
Supreme Court Judicial Database fairly closely, with a few exceptions: the separation of 
environmental cases into their own category, the inclusion of personal injury and government 
liability with noncriminal due process cases, and the inclusion of state and federal taxation into 
the same category. Miscellaneous and attorney law issues are excluded from the analysis. 
 103. This category includes issues of whether the nation or the state has authority in the area 
of police powers to promote the health, welfare, safety, and morals of the citizens; federal 
preemption of state jurisdiction and state court jurisdiction; whether there should be national or 
uniform rules of behavior; and whether states should be permitted to make their own rules. The 
intercoder reliability for whether federalism is mentioned is 88 percent. 
 104. We include federalism as one of the policy areas in the analysis. This is somewhat 
confusing because we are talking about the number of cases within the policy area of federalism 
that explicitly mention the balance of powers between states and the federal government. It 
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on the basis of the balance of state and federal power. The x-axis is 
the Term of the Court; the y-axis is the number of cases. 
Figure 4.  Attention to the Balance of Federal and State Power in 
Discrimination Cases at the Supreme Court, 1953–1985 
 
 
seems as though all federalism cases would be about this balance of power. But not all issues 
within the policy area of federalism are explicitly about the balance of power between states and 
the federal government. For example, issues of state versus federal ownership, taxation, 
interstate disputes, and the resolution of private property disputes such as marital property 
disputes, do not necessarily fall within the category of resolving the balance of power between 
states and the federal government. Therefore, not all cases within the policy area of federalism 
are coded positively as having invoked the issue of intergovernmental balance of power. Cases 
about judicial power might not seem to involve federalism questions, but these cases are coded 
positively for federalism when the case is about the balance of power between states and federal 
courts. Technically, all cases that reach the Supreme Court implicitly deal with whether federal 
jurisdiction applies because it is implied in whether the Supreme Court has the power to hear 
the case at all. Nevertheless, only opinions in which the Justices explicitly assess whether the 
case invokes questions about the balance of federal-state power are coded positively as raising 
federalism as an issue. 
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There is a lot of variation over time in the number and 
proportion of cases that mention federalism as the primary issue that 
determined the case outcome. We see small increases early on, in 
1960, 1965, and 1969. Consistent with what we might expect, there is a 
sharp increase in attention to the balance of power between the 
federal government and the states from the Warren Court to the 
Burger Court. During the Warren Court, there is an average of 2.3 
discrimination cases decided on the basis of the balance of power 
each Term, whereas during the Burger Court, there is an average of 
3.5. Nevertheless, there is quite a large amount of variation, even 
within these natural Courts. We intend to explain this variation in the 
first part of the analysis. When dissenting Justices mention that the 
Court should have decided a case on the basis of federal and state 
power, we hypothesize that there is likely to be an increase in this 
kind of case on the Supreme Court’s future agenda. We anticipate 
that this variation will occur along the recurring three-to-six-year 
cycle, as with other signals and their effect on the agenda. 
The independent variables—those factors that we hypothesize 
are the causative variables—are the number of liberal and 
conservative dissenting opinions in each policy area, for each year, 
that mention the case’s implications for the legal relationship 
between the states and the federal government. To code the 
ideological direction of the dissenting opinions (liberal or 
conservative), we identify the ideological direction of the majority 
decision and code the dissent in the opposite direction.105 Importantly, 
a dissent is only coded positively when the majority opinion does not 
mention this balance of power. Thus, signals only count as signals 
when the dissent suggests federalism as a relevant issue but the 
majority does not. Otherwise, it would be difficult to know whether 
the signal came from the dissent or the majority opinion, or whether 
the mention of federalism is a signal at all. Because this argument’s 
purpose is to assess how the dissent signals issues to transform itself 
into the majority, we focus on information that comes only from 
dissenting opinions. 
 
 105. For a discussion of these categories, see Spaeth, supra note 101. Between the Warren 
and Burger Courts, the average intercoder reliability of this variable is 99 percent. It is possible 
that in a small number of cases, the dissenting opinion is not actually ideologically opposite to 
the majority opinion. The introduction of such measurement error should not be correlated with 
the tendency of the Court to be liberal or conservative, and will lead to inefficient rather than 
biased estimates, thus resulting in more conservative estimates of findings in the analysis. 
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Table 2.  Number and Percentage of Supreme Court Cases 
Mentioning the Balance of Federal and State Powers by Policy Area, 
1953–1985 
Table 2 presents the number and percentage of cases from 1953 
through 1985 that were decided at least partially on the basis of the 
balance of power between the states and the federal government. 
There is considerable variation across policy areas in conservative 
and liberal cases decided on this basis—ranging from 3.5 percent of 
cases in the privacy policy area to 50.4 percent in the substantive 
federalism policy area—but the percentage of cases most commonly 
ranges between 5 and 20 percent. There are not large differences 
between the percentage of liberal and conservative cases that 
Policy Area Federalism in 
Majority 
Opinion 
Federalism in 
Liberal 
Dissent Only 
Federalism in 
Conservative 
Dissent Only 
Total Number 
of All Cases 
Discrimination 159 (15.6%) 16 (1.6%) 25 (2.5%) 1424 
First Amendment 25 (4.6%) 2 (0.4%) 20 (3.7%) 712 
Privacy 2 (3.5%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (5.3%) 105 
Criminal Rights 79 (5.8%) 17 (1.3%) 12 (0.9%) 1873 
Labor 25 (8.4%) 1 (0.3%) 2 (0.7%) 353 
Environment 21 (21.6%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (3.1%) 126 
Economic 
Regulation 104 (10.7%) 7 (0.7%) 12 (1.2%) 1239 
Taxation 64 (20.1%) 3 (0.9%) 5 (1.6%) 430 
Due Process & 
Government 
Liability 
25 (9.8%) 3 (1.2%) 2 (0.8%) 365 
Judicial Power 99 (9.6%) 9 (0.9%) 9 (0.9%) 1373 
Federalism 141 (50.4%) 10 (3.6%) 5 (1.8%) 438 
Note: These policy area categories match Spaeth’s coding of “Value” from the United 
States Supreme Court Judicial Database closely, with a few exceptions: the separation of 
environmental cases into their own category, the inclusion of personal injury and government 
liability with noncriminal due process cases, and the inclusion of state and federal taxation into the 
same category. Furthermore, miscellaneous and attorney law issues are excluded from the 
analysis. 
Phase II of the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database codes every opinion for 
whether the case’s topic involves the balance of power between the states and the federal 
government. Moreover, every opinion is coded for whether it expands or restricts the powers of 
the states or the federal government in relation to one another. The presence of federalism is 
coded positively when the topic is the balance of power or when the value either expands or 
restricts federal or state power. 
All orally argued cases, whether they resulted in signed or unsigned opinions, including per 
curium decisions and judgments, are counted. Memoranda, decrees, multiple docket numbers, and 
any case that resulted in a split vote are excluded. Some case citations represent multiple issues. 
When these issues span across different policy areas, they are counted once for each issue 
represented; otherwise, they are counted only once. 
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mention the balance of state and federal power, but the tendency 
leans slightly toward liberal majority opinions. Dissents that mention 
federalism when the majority opinion does not mention federalism 
are relatively rare, constituting about 1 percent of all cases. There 
also does not seem to be a great difference between the number of 
liberal and conservative dissents, though conservative dissents are 
slightly more common in the areas of First Amendment, 
discrimination, privacy, and the environment. 
We hypothesize that liberal dissents should cause a move in the 
liberal direction of those cases that are decided according to 
federalism; conservative dissents should cause a move in a 
conservative direction. To test these hypotheses, we need to measure 
the ideological placement of Supreme Court policy output. With this 
measure, we can estimate the change in the ideological placement 
from the time that the signal went out to the time that the new 
majority opinion mentioning federalism is handed down. Section A.2 
discusses the measure of the ideological placement of cases, and 
Section B tests the three hypotheses. 
2. Measuring the Placement of Case Outcomes.  Both legal 
scholarship generally and judicial scholarship in particular have 
become increasingly influenced by empiricism in recent years,106 and 
that empiricism has garnered the attention of judges, legislators, and 
the press.107 Nevertheless, during the last four decades of this 
scholarship, scholars have not developed a sophisticated objective 
measure of case outcomes. 
Traditionally, judicial scholars have used the percentage of 
liberal decisions to measure the Supreme Court’s outputs for any 
given year.108 Therefore, a year in which 40 percent of the Court’s 
decisions were liberal has been considered more conservative than a 
year in which 60 percent of the Court’s decisions were liberal. There 
is a problem with this measure, in that some liberal cases are more 
liberal than other liberal cases. If two students took math exams, but 
 
 106. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–14 (2002) 
(reviewing the increasing use of formal empiricism in legal analysis). 
 107. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic 
Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 748–49 (2005) (describing increased 
public notice of empirical research on judicial decisionmaking). 
 108. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker & William J. Dixon, The Supreme Court and 
Criminal Justice Disputes: A Neo-Institutional Perspective, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825, 830–35 
(1989). 
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one took a calculus test and the other took an addition quiz, looking 
at the percent of correct answers of each student would not be a fair 
way of comparing their mathematical competence.109 Michael Bailey 
reasons that comparing two judges’ percentage of liberal votes across 
different “tests”—i.e. case votes—is similarly unreliable. The same 
judge may vote liberally 40 percent in one Term and then vote 
liberally 80 percent in another Term that presented more 
conservative proposals, without changing her underlying 
preferences.110 
For example, the Court may be presented with a case in which 
pro-defendant litigants ask the Court to make a decision that would 
set precedent disallowing any search without a warrant. If the Court 
issues that ruling, it is a more liberal outcome than if the Court 
disallows only some searches under certain conditions without a 
warrant. Both cases would be coded as liberal according to a 
dichotomous measure because both protect the defendant in 
question. They are different from one another, however, because one 
is more liberal than the other. Treating them as interchangeable, as 
does the traditional measure of case outcomes, is unsound. 
Not only is the traditional measure of case outcomes 
theoretically weak in this way, but it also does not make use of all 
available information. In addition to coding whether a case is liberal 
or conservative, the standard judicial databases provide information 
on the makeup of judicial coalitions in each case. Thus, we can use a 
measure of case outcomes that aggregates the overall proclivities of 
each Justice in the majority coalition as a summary of the position of 
each case outcome. We use the average of the preference scores of 
every Justice in the majority coalition. 
The essential theory behind using this measure is that case 
outcomes will be a product of negotiations among the majority 
coalition. Professor Jacobi’s prior work has provided a more formal 
study of the soundness of using the mean of the majority coalition as 
a measure of case outcomes,111 as well as an empirical examination of 
whether such a measure adequately captures the Supreme Court’s 
 
 109. We would like to thank Michael Bailey for this example. 
 110. See Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates Across Time and Institutions 
for the Court, Congress and Presidency, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433, 436–38 (2007) (elaborating on 
associated problems arising from assuming direct translation of these scores across time within 
an institution, as well as across institutions). 
 111. Tonja Jacobi, Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formation and Case Outcome 
Determination, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411, 445 (2009). 
BAIRD-JACOBI IN FINAL.DOC 10/6/2009  6:28:09 PM 
2009] HOW THE DISSENT BECOMES THE MAJORITY 219 
cases over the last half century.112 Professors Jacobi and Sag find that 
the mean of the majority coalition is more sound than any other 
existing measure of case outcomes.113 
Using this measure also addresses the concern that Professor 
Bailey raises, because the measure implicitly captures the variation in 
case facts among Court cases. If only five of the most liberal Justices 
agreed with a decision, then the case was probably not an “easy 
case,” in contrast to a case upon which the entire Court can 
unanimously agree. If a unanimous Court agrees to a change, then 
the outcome will be fairly moderate, reflecting the views of the 
Court’s median Justice. But a 5–4 liberal holding will reflect the views 
of the liberal Justices signing onto the opinion—that is, the holding 
will reflect the views of the median Justice of the coalition. 
The mean of the majority coalition has been shown to be both 
formally and empirically sound, but to ensure that our results do not 
stem from the use of this measure, Professor Jacobi reran our analysis 
using the theoretically inferior traditional percentage liberal measure. 
The results were substantially identical to our results.114 
To develop a measure of Supreme Court ideological outputs that 
can be derived from an ideological continuum that is constant over 
time, a valid estimate of the preferences of Supreme Court Justices is 
necessary. Professors Martin and Quinn developed a measure of ideal 
points of Supreme Court Justices,115 similar to sophisticated measures 
of congressional preferences.116 The Justices’ ideal points are based on 
a rank ordering of Justices on a constant standard, although as Martin 
and Quinn find, these points can change over time.117 It is essential 
that the measure rests on a standardized scale because our analysis 
takes place over half a century. 
 
 112. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring 
Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1345982. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Jacobi, supra note 111, at 450–51. Using the percentage liberal measure, conservative 
dissents move the Court in a conservative direction by 6.04 percent, and liberal dissents move 
the Court in a liberal direction by 13.58 percent. Id. at 449. The p-values using this measure are 
0.03 and 0.02 respectively—enough to establish the effect with confidence. Id. This is 
comparable to our results, presented infra Part III.B. 
 115. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 92, at 134–35. 
 116. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 94, at 233–49 (introducing the D-NOMINATE 
scores of congressional preferences). 
 117. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 92, at 152. 
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Professors Martin and Quinn take advantage of voting coalitions 
to make inferences about the relative placement of Justices.118 A 
Justice who is often a lone dissenter in conservative cases will be 
ranked as more liberal than a colleague who sometimes joins that 
Justice in 7–2 conservative decisions. If the colleague is rarely the 
lone dissenter in conservative cases, then that colleague will be 
designated as somewhat more conservative. A moderate Justice can 
change places with another moderate Justice by increasing the 
number of conservative or liberal votes as compared with the other 
Justice. This measure provides standardized comparisons over time. 
Thus, even though Justice Breyer was never on the Court with Justice 
Brennan, their scores can be compared because Justice Brennan was 
on the Court with other Justices who were on the Court with Justice 
Breyer, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist. Therefore, the rank-order 
measure simultaneously accounts for change over time and across 
Justices for all years, rendering the Justices’ ideal points a 
standardized comparison with one another over time. 
We illustrate the Justices’ positions on the current Court in 
Figure 2. The Martin-Quinn scores closely align with press and 
popular perceptions of the Justices’ relative ideological positions.119 
Not only do the relative positions look about right—and thus the 
Martin-Quinn scores pass the “smell test”—but the results are 
consistent enough that we can refer to negative scores as liberal and 
positive scores as conservative, even though Professors Martin and 
Quinn do not incorporate any measure of directionality into their 
scores. Unsurprisingly, then, negative (that is, liberal) Martin-Quinn 
 
 118. Id. at 147. 
 119. In 2004, Justice O’Connor held the position of median Justice with a Martin-Quinn 
score of 0.08. With her retirement and the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy 
has become the median Justice with a Martin-Quinn score of 0.49. Media portraits of Justice 
Kennedy as the Court’s new swing vote fit very well with Professors Martin and Quinn’s 
analysis. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, In Second Term, Roberts Court Defines Itself; Many 5 to 4 
Decisions Reflect Narrowly Split Court That Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at 
A3; Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle; Court’s 5 to 4 
Decisions Underscore His Power, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, at A1. Historically, the most 
extreme Justices on the Court since 1937 were Justice Douglas in 1974, who scored -6.33, and 
then-Justice Rehnquist in 1975, who scored 4.31. When Rehnquist became Chief Justice, he 
became more moderate, with an average score of 1.48. The most consistently conservative 
Justice on the Court has been Justice Thomas, with a score of 3.77. The historical mean of the 
Court is approximately 0. Court observers would agree that Justice Stevens is more liberal than 
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, who in turn are more liberal than Justice Kennedy. They 
would also agree that Justices Alito and Roberts are more conservative than Justice Kennedy 
but less conservative than Justice Scalia, who is only less conservative than Justice Thomas. 
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scores correlate with a positive (that is, Democrat) coding in the 
traditional party of the appointing president proxy for judicial 
ideology, whereas positive/conservative Martin-Quinn scores accord 
with a Republican president’s appointment of a Justice; nevertheless, 
the scores provide a much more nuanced measure of judicial 
ideology.120 
To measure the placement of each decision, we used these ideal 
points to calculate the position of each case by computing the mean 
of the Martin-Quinn ideal points of the majority coalition Justices in 
each case. We then aggregate these majority coalition means for each 
year and policy area. This measure is not perfectly accurate for 
several reasons. First, the Justices’ relative bargaining power in 
determining a case’s outcome is not clear from the decision. Second, 
the measure is aggregated to the policy area from various cases; 
therefore, two identical means could have different standard 
deviations, making it more difficult to make inferences about the 
placement of the means. Nonetheless, we believe that this measure is 
a valid indication of where the Supreme Court places its policies—it 
improves upon the simplistic dichotomous conception of liberal 
versus conservative.121 
Now that we have shown how to place each case on an 
ideological spectrum, we must also show how we aggregate these 
 
 120. See Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in 
Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 838 (2009) (finding that when 
using both Martin-Quinn scores and party of the appointing president, the Martin-Quinn scores 
soak up all of the explanatory power of party of the appointing president). 
 121. See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 112 (showing the superiority of the mean of the majority 
coalition measure to the traditional percentage liberal-conservative measure). A qualitative 
analysis of the mean of the majority coalition measure also reveals that it measures the 
placement of Supreme Court cases fairly well. For example, the most conservative 
discrimination case on the Supreme Court’s agenda from 1953 to 2000, according to our 
measure, is San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). This is 
probably the case that stands out in people’s minds as one of the most conservative 
discrimination cases in the period analyzed, because it allows the unequal distribution of funds 
for schools, even though that distribution largely correlated with national origin. Some might 
argue that this decision reverted back to a de facto discrimination that would have allowed more 
discrimination than Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which condoned “separate but 
equal” treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 550–51. The most liberal case in the 
policy area of discrimination in the time frame is Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), which 
sustained a local court order allowing local officials to ignore state tax laws about raising money 
for failing schools to prevent further white flight to the suburbs, id. at 33. This case was 
extremely controversial, and many states requested that Congress take action to overturn the 
decision. The Supreme Court finally overturned their own decision five years later in Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
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cases to measure the average ideological movement for each policy 
area across time. This is important because our theory relies on 
finding changes in these overall aggregate trends. Figure 5 plots the 
average of the mean of the majority coalition scores for all First 
Amendment cases from the 1953 Term through the 1999 Term. The 
x-axis is the Term of the Court; the y-axis is the average score of that 
Term’s cases, using the mean of the majority coalition measure of 
case outcomes. For each case, we calculate the mean of each majority 
member’s ideal points and average the means across all First 
Amendment Cases for the year. The plot includes information about 
the standard deviation of these ideal points. This way, we can observe 
that in some years, liberal members of the Court tended to be in the 
majority more often, and in other years, conservative members of the 
Court tended to be in the majority more often. This is true even when 
the Court’s membership does not change. The lighter lines show the 
standard deviations around the score of each case. 
Figure 5.  Average of Ideological Positions for All First 
Amendment Cases at the Supreme Court, 1953–1999 Terms 
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Personnel changes on the Court affect these scores. The graph 
shows that the Warren Court was much more liberal on First 
Amendment issues than the Burger Court. There is also, however, a 
large amount of variation within natural Courts. For example, 1959 
and 1960 were more conservative years on the Warren Court. And 
although 1972 was the most conservative year for First Amendment 
issues, the average dropped in the following years. The conservative 
averages in years 1975 through 1977 were followed by a more liberal 
era from 1979 through 1981. This means that even with the same (or 
mostly the same) Justices on the Court, either the liberal or the 
conservative coalition is tending to dominate the majority coalitions 
for that year. Justices are not just changing their minds about their 
preferences; instead, the nature of the questions posed to the Court 
are changing. The Justices are responding to questions posed by the 
litigants. As a result of these questions, moderate Justices sometimes 
vote with their more conservative colleagues; at other times, the 
moderate Justices vote with their liberal colleagues. 
Another aspect of this figure worth noting is the striking 
variation of the standard deviations of these majority coalitions. 
Standard deviations measure the dispersion around the mean. When 
the standard deviation is high, there is likely to be a high number of 
both conservative majorities and liberal majorities, and these 
majorities are more likely to be split along ideological lines in 5–4 or 
6–3 outcomes. A low standard deviation could indicate many 
unanimous decisions, or it could indicate that liberals or 
conservatives completely dominated that year. From 1959 through 
1962, the mean is more conservative compared to previous and future 
years, but the standard deviation is high, showing that there are some 
cases that the liberal coalition won. From 1966 through 1968, the 
standard deviation was low, but the means show that the liberal 
coalitions are dominating. From 1983 through 1988, there are more 
moderate outcomes but very high standard deviations. This indicates 
that there are many split decisions, with 5–4 or 6–3 coalitions, and 
that both the liberal and conservative coalitions are winning a 
significant proportion of those cases. 
Our hypotheses are that signals in dissenting opinions will call 
for questions that will place the dissent more often in the majority. 
Liberal dissents lead to more liberal outcomes in the future, and 
conservative dissents lead to more conservative outcomes in the 
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future.122 Using cases dealing with judicial power, Figure 6 illustrates 
the potential differences in cases’ ideological outcomes based on 
whether the cases considered the issue of federal and state power.123 
The x-axis is the Term of the Court; the y-axis is the average score of 
that Term’s cases, using the mean of the majority coalition measure 
of case outcomes. 
The first thing to notice is that, not surprisingly, these trends 
vary together. Another thing to notice is that, during the Warren 
Court years, the cases that are decided on the basis of federal-state 
power tend to be more liberal than the average case. This tends in the 
opposite direction during the Burger Court. The federal-state power 
cases are at times more liberal than other cases, such as in 1962, 1964, 
1967, 1971, and 1974. In other years, the federal-state power cases 
were more conservative than other cases, such as in 1954, 1959, 1970, 
1974 through 1976, and 1980 though 1982. This is the difference in the 
outcomes that we explain: we expect that litigants responding to 
signals will bring cases with particular facts and legal questions that 
will, on average, benefit those Justices who signaled for these cases in 
their dissents. Looking at the difference in ideological balance 
between cases that are framed according to the federal-state powers 
issues and those that are not will help control for the Court’s general 
ideological changes across years. 
 
 122. Note that we are testing the change in the ideological dimension, not the exact position 
in two-dimensional space. We are not measuring the movement within a federalism dimension; 
rather, we are examining the extent to which Justices who have voted in a particular way on the 
ideological dimension can be persuaded to vote differently when litigants frame the issues in 
terms of federalism. Although our results in Figures 8 and 9 are suggestive that a second 
federalism dimension is operative in judicial decisionmaking, our analysis does not depend on 
establishing that Justices line up often enough in a consistent manner to constitute a significant 
second dimension in all judicial decisionmaking. Rather, we test whether federalism is 
sufficiently salient to alter outcomes in the ideological space. 
 123. The most common Judicial Power issues are judicial review of administrative agencies, 
resolution of circuit conflict or conflict between other courts, mootness, jurisdiction, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, writ improvidently granted, comity, personal injury, venue, private or 
implied cause of action, justiciable questions, and standing. 
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Figure 6.  Mean of Majority Ideal Points for Judicial Power 
Cases at the Supreme Court, 1953–1985 
 
In sum, we use a measure of the ideological placement of 
Supreme Court policy outputs, aggregating Professors Martin and 
Quinn’s ideal points of each Justice in the majority to get a value of 
the mean of the majority coalition for each case. We then aggregate 
the means across all years and policy areas from the 1953 Term 
through the 1985 Term. These measures can be calculated for any 
subset of cases. We look for ideological change from the time of the 
signal to the cases resulting from the signal. 
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
Cases with federal 
versus state power 
implications
Cases without 
federal versus state 
power implications
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
BAIRD-JACOBI IN FINAL.DOC 10/6/2009  6:28:09 PM 
226 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:183 
B. Results 
1. The Effect of Federalism Dissents on the Number of Federalism 
Cases.  The question we address here is whether dissenting opinions 
that mention the federal-state balance of power in certain policy 
areas cause litigants to reconsider how they frame their cases (or 
groups to reconsider which case facts and legal arguments to choose), 
resulting in an increase in majority outcomes in the same policy area 
that are decided (at least partially) on the basis of state versus federal 
power. 
The units of analysis are the policy area for each Supreme Court 
Term from 1953 through 1985. The signals and the resulting agenda 
transformation are hypothesized to occur within each policy area. 
The independent variable is the number of conservative and number 
of liberal dissenting opinions that mention federal-state power when 
the majority opinion makes no mention of federalism. We use 
techniques that ensure that no error arises from the fact that we are 
examining cases over time.124 We also allow for correlations that may 
exist among the policy areas, and moreover, we control for the effects 
of any correlation within each policy area by including policy-area 
dummy variables.125 
Figure 7 shows the results for the test of hypothesis 1. The x-axis 
is the time lag between the dissent’s discussion of federalism and later 
majority opinions that mention federalism; the y-axis is the number of 
cases resulting. The figure shows the impact of federalism dissents on 
majority opinions within a 95 percent confidence interval. Figure 7 
shows, as hypothesized, that the number of dissenting opinions that 
 
 124. We use Ordinary Least Squares parameter estimates with panel corrected standard 
errors, according to the recommendation of Professors Beck and Katz. See Nathaniel Beck & 
Jonathan N. Katz, What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data, 89 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 634, 634–35 (1995). 
 125. Because we are dealing with time-series data—that is, data that includes multiple years 
of Court activity—we need to check that our results are not perverted by autocorrelation—that 
is, regression results shaped by the internal correlation of a variable with itself over time. To 
deal with autocorrelation, we include a specification for an autocorrelation term of the first 
order. For example, we include a one-year-lagged version of the variable. When there are no 
cases that mention federalism in the majority opinion, there is missing data on the dependent 
variable. In these cases, we substituted lagged values of the dependent variable. In cases in 
which there are four years of continuous missing data, we substituted the mean of the majority 
opinion for all cases. This is problematic because it includes possibilities of movements that 
were not caused by outcomes affected by the transformation. We therefore corroborated our 
analysis using only those cases in which majority opinions mention federalism, but we use pair-
wise regression (otherwise, computation is impossible). The results are substantively identical. 
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mention federalism in each policy area (only when the majority 
makes no mention of state versus federal power) has a positive 
impact on the number of subsequent majority opinions that mention 
federalism. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.08 level 
for a two-tailed test. But because we had a good theoretical reason to 
expect a positive effect, there is reason to use a one-tailed test, in 
which case it would be significant at the well-accepted 0.05 
probability.126 
Figure 7.  The Effect of Dissenting Opinions that Mention 
Federalism on Majority Opinions that Mention Federalism 
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 126. When a hypothesis specifies an expected difference, but not the direction of that 
difference, a two-tailed test is appropriate. But when the hypothesis includes the directionality 
of the effect, a one-tailed test is appropriate. Using a 0.05 test of statistical significance under a 
one-tailed test, the null hypothesis can be rejected if the value of the test statistic falls in the top 
or bottom 0.05 end of the distribution, whichever was hypothesized. In contrast, under a two-
tailed test, the null hypothesis is rejected if the value falls in either end of the distribution, but 
only if it falls in the 0.025 range. Both distributions add up to 5 percent, resulting in 95 percent 
confidence in the results, but the direction of the effect under a one-tailed test must be 
prespecified in the hypothesis. 
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Court’s agenda that have implications for the balance of power between the states and the 
federal government, across eleven policy areas from 1953–1985. The independent variable 
presented here is the number of dissenting opinions that mention state-federal balance of 
power, when the majority opinion does not mention federalism. The y-axis plots the slope 
coefficient and the x-axis plots the lag year of the effect. Controls in this analysis include policy 
area dummy variables, a Burger Court dummy, the legislative agenda, and the absolute value 
change of the median Justice. 
This process takes six years, which is closely consistent with 
Professor Baird’s finding that politically salient decisions cause 
litigation that affects the Supreme Court’s agenda four and five years 
later.127 Because litigation encouraged by federalism-based signals has 
a de facto prerequisite that a state or federal government actor first 
act in a way that causes the case or controversy that results in 
litigation (for example, by enacting legislation), it is unsurprising that 
it takes on average one to two years longer for these dissenting 
opinions to have an impact on future majority outcomes. 
Substantially, one federalism dissent results in 0.20 later majority 
opinions based on federalism. This effect is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level.128 This figure probably understates the substantive 
effect for a number of reasons. First, because the Supreme Court has 
discretion over granting certiorari, our results are likely to 
underestimate the extent to which federalism dissents instigate future 
cases, as an earlier dissent may produce many more certiorari 
petitions than the Court hears. Thus, our results will capture the 
minimum effect that federalism dissents provoke. 
The second reason why our results may underestimate the effect 
of federalism dissents is that we are testing the statistical significance 
of an effect in any given year, and so our coefficients do not capture 
any cases that are instigated when there is variation in the time lag. 
The effect often may happen at earlier stages, with responses to the 
signals in other years that simply did not achieve statistical 
significance. Our results are conservative because they expect a result 
that is statistically significant in a particular year; a cumulative test 
would show a larger effect, but poses the danger of overinclusion. We 
therefore have conducted the hardest test, and nevertheless have 
 
 127. Baird, supra note 80, at 761–66. 
 128. We estimated using Generalized Least Squares computing Ordinary Least Squares 
with panel-corrected standard errors according to the recommendations of Professors Beck and 
Katz, supra note 124, at 634–35. We specified a model that allows for correlation among the 
cross sections, controlled for variation in the number of issues across policy areas by including a 
dummy variable for each policy area, and included a specification for an autocorrelation term of 
the first order. 
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shown a result that is both statistically significant and substantially 
meaningful. 
Moreover, we have been as restrictive as possible in our 
definitions, only allowing dissenting opinions when the majority does 
not mention federalism. Concurring opinions may have an impact. 
Or, there may be signals outside of the particular policy area that 
have an impact we would not observe in this analysis. Because this 
analysis is a conservative estimate of the impact of these signals on 
the resulting agenda, we can be confident in the rigor of the results. 
Thus, this first result provides strong support for the conclusion 
proposed by our first hypothesis that dissents based on federalism 
when the majority opinion is not based on federalism encourage 
litigants to bring similar cases on federalism grounds. 
2. Explaining the Supreme Court’s Ideological Movement in 
Federalism Cases.  Our first hypothesis was that federalism-based 
dissents result in significantly more federalism-based majority 
opinions in the same policy area four to six years later. Our first set of 
results have supported this hypothesis. Our second hypothesis is that 
conservative dissenting opinions that mention federal-state power, 
when the majority opinion does not, lead to future majority opinions 
that mention federal-state power and move the Court’s ideological 
placement in a conservative direction. The third hypothesis states the 
same for liberal dissenting opinions, which should lead to greater 
liberal policy output. As a reminder, the dependent variable is a 
measure of ideological movement, equaling the change in the 
ideological placement of the Court’s majority opinion at year 0 (the 
case in which the dissent signals for the transformation) to the 
ideological placement of those cases in later years. 
Our expectation, then, is that a federalism-based dissenting 
opinion at year 0 leads to a significant movement in the ideological 
placement of cases in that policy area at approximately year 6, when 
the majority opinion recognizes the case’s implications for federal 
versus state power. It would be disconfirming to see large movements 
in years 0 through 3. This is a conservative test, as some signals could 
result in cases earlier than six years, particularly if litigants reframe 
those cases in response to the signal at an earlier stage—for example, 
between phases of litigation. 
A positive value is a move in the dependent variable—the 
overall average of the mean of the majority coalitions in a given area 
of law in any year—in a conservative direction. A negative value 
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indicates a move in a liberal direction. Thus, liberal dissents should 
cause negative movements and conservative dissents should cause 
positive movements. Ideological change ranges from -2.15 to 2.59. 
The mean of the dependent variable is 0.11 and the standard 
deviation is 0.74. There is considerable variation in the position of the 
Court’s case outcomes over time. 
Much of this change may have to do with a change in the 
placement of the median Justice due to, for example, replacements on 
the Court. For this reason, we control for this change by including a 
variable equal to the median Justice’s ideal point. Using this control is 
advantageous because it accounts for various causes of median 
change, including judicial replacement, judicial attitude shifts over 
time, and changes in the political administration or Congress. 
Because of the many ways in which the Court’s median can change, 
and because we want to fully ensure that our findings do not stem 
from ideological changes on the Court, we also include lags of the 
absolute value change in the median Justice’s ideal point for each 
year. 
Due to insufficient data, we must exclude from these analyses 
some of the eleven policy areas the Supreme Court considers. If the 
entire time period had fewer than two dissenting opinions that 
mention federalism when the majority opinion did not, we deleted the 
policy area from the analysis. In the analysis of the effect of 
conservative dissenting signals, we do not exclude any policy areas; in 
the analysis of the effect of liberal dissenting signals, we exclude the 
policy areas of privacy, environment, and labor. 
a. The Conservative Hypothesis.  Figure 8 presents the results of 
the analysis of conservative dissenting opinions. The effect of liberal 
dissents is shown below. Running the tests in one regression has 
identical results. We present them separately here for clarity in the 
direction of the movement of the dependent variable for each type of 
signal. It shows the change in the direction of the Court’s placement 
over a six-year time period. The x-axis is the time lag between a 
federalism dissent and a later majority opinion, and the y-axis is the 
estimated effect of the signal on the mean of the majority coalitions. 
The center line shows the movement in case outcomes over time; the 
two outer lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals. Thus, there is 
a significant effect on the placement of Supreme Court cases in a year 
when the confidence interval lies entirely above the x-axis. 
BAIRD-JACOBI IN FINAL.DOC 10/6/2009  6:28:09 PM 
2009] HOW THE DISSENT BECOMES THE MAJORITY 231 
Figure 8.  The Effect of Conservative Dissenting Opinions on the 
Change in the Ideological Placement of the Supreme Court’s Policy 
Outputs that Mention Federal Versus State Power 
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Note: Estimates are Ordinary Least Square unstandardized regression coefficients and 
confidence intervals are computed using panel corrected standard errors, calculated according 
to Beck and Katz (1995). The dependent variable is the ideological placement of the Supreme 
Court’s cases in which the majority opinion mentions the balance of power between the states 
and the federal government, across eleven policy areas from 1953–1985. The independent 
variable presented here is the number of conservative dissenting opinions that mention 
federalism when the majority opinion does not mention federalism. The y-axis plots the slope 
coefficient and the x-axis plots the lag year of the effect. Controls in this analysis include policy 
area dummy variables, a Burger Court dummy, the legislative agenda, and the absolute value 
change of the median Justice. 
As discussed, conservative movements are positive and liberal 
movements are negative. Thus, Figure 8 shows that six years after a 
conservative dissenting signal that mentions federal-state powers, 
there is a significant movement in the overall placement of Supreme 
Court cases in any given policy area. Additionally, in the fifth year 
after the conservative dissenting signal, there is a distinct movement 
in a conservative direction, but this effect does not rise to the point of 
statistical significance. The effect in the fifth year is nonetheless 
important. Because we predicted an effect in the sixth year, but 
anticipated that an effect could arise as early as the fourth or fifth 
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year, the effect on the fifth and sixth year combined is even more 
substantively significant. At any rate, the effect on the sixth year is 
both substantively and statistically significant in the direction we 
hypothesized. 
b. The Liberal Hypothesis.  A skeptic looking at Figure 8 may 
think that federal-state power is really just a façade for conservative 
arguments. We find, however, that the effect we identify in Figure 8 is 
not limited to conservative dissents. In Figure 9, we see a similar 
effect for liberal dissents; in fact, the effect is even greater. Once 
again, in the sixth year after a liberal dissent mentions federal-state 
power when the majority does not, the overall Court outcomes in that 
area of the law move in a significantly liberal direction. In the case of 
liberal dissents, case outcomes in the fifth year are considerably more 
liberal than in year 0, and even more so in the fourth year. Once 
again, the other-year effects are not statistically significant; but once 
again, they dilute the extent to which we can measure the impact on 
the sixth year. Nonetheless, liberal dissents that mention federalism 
cause a statistically significant move in a liberal direction in the 
Court’s overall policy outputs six years after the dissenting signal. 
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Figure 9.  The Effect of Liberal Dissenting Opinions on the 
Change in the Ideological Placement of the Supreme Court’s Policy 
Outputs that Mention Federal Versus State Power 
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Note: Estimates are Ordinary Least Square unstandardized regression coefficients and 
confidence intervals are computed using panel corrected standard errors, calculated according 
to Beck and Katz (1995). The dependent variable is the ideological placement of the Supreme 
Court’s cases in which the majority opinion mentions the balance of power between the states 
and the federal government, across eight policy areas from 1953–1985. The independent 
variable presented here is the number of liberal dissenting opinions that mention federalism 
when the majority opinion does not mention federalism. The y-axis plots the slope coefficient 
and the x-axis plots the lag year of the effect. The policy areas of privacy, environment, and 
labor are excluded because there were fewer than two instances of liberal dissenting opinions 
that mention federalism when the majority opinion does not. Controls in this analysis include 
policy area dummy variables, a Burger Court dummy, the legislative agenda, and the absolute 
value change of the median Justice. 
Another concern may be that federalism simply is becoming 
more important over time. To confirm that our results were not a 
product of a general increase in the importance of federalism over 
time, we included a linear time control variable. This variable was not 
significant. Thus, our results are not driven by some jurisprudential 
change in federalism itself over time. 
3. The Magnitude of the Impact.  The results are as we 
hypothesized for both conservative and liberal dissents: conservative 
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dissents that mention federal-state powers move case outcomes in a 
conservative (positive) direction, and liberal dissents cause moves in 
a liberal (negative) direction. This effect is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level in both analyses, as expected, after six years. The time 
trends have the shape expected: minimal effects in years 0 through 3, 
some effects in years 4 through 5, and statistically significant 
movements in both conservative and liberal directions six years after 
a conservative or liberal dissenting signal, respectively. As 
anticipated, the effect drops off again in years 7 and 8, after the 
signals have achieved their purpose. 
Thus, all three hypotheses are supported by findings of 
statistically significant effects in the directions predicted. But are 
these effects substantively significant? To answer this question, we 
need to put the movements measured in Figures 8 and 9 into context. 
A dissent based on federalism moves the overall direction of the 
Supreme Court in a given policy area after six years by 0.14 for 
conservative dissents and 0.22 for liberal dissents. The standard 
deviation of the change in the overall Court’s position over the thirty-
three years studied is approximately 0.74. This means that a 
federalism-based dissent moves outcomes by approximately one-
fourth or more of the standard deviation of the whole scale. This 
makes the effect extremely large. 
We can break down our results further, taking into account the 
effect of different-sized majority coalitions. The above results were 
for tests run on cases for all-sized majority coalitions. But we would 
expect that 8–1 and 7–2 majorities would typically be too stable to be 
overturned easily by transformation onto a procedural dimension 
(there are of course no dissenting signals for 9–0 majorities). In 
contrast, we would expect much more significant effects on a closer 
case, in which it should be easier to overturn majorities by 
transforming the case into one about federal-state powers. Running 
the same tests for only 5–4 and 6–3 majorities produces even stronger 
results than those shown in Figures 8 and 9. Conservative dissenting 
signals move Supreme Court outcomes in a conservative direction by 
0.29 for 5–4 and 6–3 majorities. Liberal dissenting signals move 
majority outcomes in a liberal direction by 0.25 for 5–4 and 6–3 
majorities.129 Though we present the effects of liberal and 
conservative dissents on case outcome movement separately, we 
 
 129. The effect of conservative signals is significant beyond 99 percent confidence; the effect 
of liberal signals just approaches significance with 94 percent confidence. 
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again also tested the effect of liberal and conservative dissents in the 
same model. These effects are substantively identical. 
Altogether, our results provide strong support for both 
ideological movement hypotheses, as well as for the general 
proposition that dissenting signals can transform the basis on which 
litigants argue future cases. Not only do dissents based on federal-
state powers result in significantly more cases being argued on that 
basis in the relevant substantive policy area, but signaling provides 
Justices who were previously on the losing side of an issue with an 
opportunity to create winning coalitions. In this way, dissenting 
Justices can move the overall direction of case outcomes in a given 
policy area in their preferred direction. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
We find that dissenting opinions that mention a case’s 
implications for federal-state powers implicitly suggest to like-minded 
litigants possible ways to frame cases to win over a majority of 
Justices. We also find that this strategy crosses ideological bounds. 
Both liberal and conservative Justices use this strategy, and it is 
effective for both. Federalism is not simply a façade for conservatism; 
both liberal and conservative dissents move policy outcomes in their 
favored direction, precisely in those cases that mention federalism in 
later majority opinions. Thus, dissenting signals based on federalism 
succeed at moving policy in the dissenting coalition’s favored 
direction. 
These findings suggest that the historical illustrations we present 
in this Article are not anomalous. Furthermore, although our primary 
example about Bacon’s park is one in which the same litigants 
responded to the signal to achieve a different outcome, our results 
show that signaling has value beyond the bounds of relitigation of the 
same dispute. Signals can cause a new chain of events in a different 
circumstance to bring about litigation framed in a specific way. These 
results have significant implications in a variety of areas, including: 
the phenomenon of judicial signaling, the use of issue fluidity, the 
importance of federalism, the nature of judicial behavior, litigant 
responsiveness to that behavior, and judicial agenda setting. 
First, our findings confirm that judicial signaling occurs and is a 
powerful tool for Justices to shape both their agendas and the 
outcome of cases. Signaling shapes judicial agendas by encouraging 
litigants to bring cases of the type and on the terms that the Justices 
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desire. The results confirm that six years after the original dissenting 
federalism signal, there is a significant increase in cases arguing the 
issue on federalism grounds. Signaling also shapes the outcome of 
later cases by allowing the Justices to propose alternative grounds on 
which to decide cases. These grounds have been shown to provide 
means of undermining previous majorities and reversing earlier 
outcomes. Liberal dissenting signals result in future cases decided in a 
liberal direction; conservative dissenting signals result in future cases 
decided in a conservative direction. 
Second, although our results in no way disprove or discredit the 
notion of issue fluidity, they do show that dissenting Justices often 
have other options available to them to achieve alternative outcomes. 
Even if the Justices can manipulate the issues of cases presented to 
them, they may well be more likely to persuade their colleagues to 
join them when those issues are framed by litigants, rather than 
invented by the Justices themselves. Given the normative constraints 
that operate against the use of issue fluidity, it is unsurprising that 
signaling has been shown to be a tool often used by the Justices. 
Third, our results suggest the importance of federalism in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence as an alternative means of deciding 
cases across the spectrum of issue categories. Additionally, these 
results indicate the manipulative power of federalism. It has been 
shown that Justices regularly use federalism as an alternative means 
of deciding cases within those categories, and as a means of achieving 
the reverse outcome in a case decided on the basis of the substantive 
issue of law. 
But our results have significance beyond federalism. Although 
dissenting federalism signals occur in only 1 percent of cases, we have 
identified a phenomenon that may be utilized in other areas. This 
includes judicial attempts to destabilize a majority through other 
means, whether through procedural means such as standing, or 
through an alternative substantive dimension. More generally, our 
results show that the way in which litigants frame cases is highly 
determinative of the cases’ outcomes. This lends support to various 
analyses of judicial interpretive methods—such as Professor Brest’s 
contention that manipulation of the level of generality of a legal 
question is highly determinative of its answer130—and it opens the 
door to future studies of other means of fracturing majority opinions. 
 
 130. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of 
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1078–85 (1981). 
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Fourth, our findings show that a form of strategic judicial 
behavior—signaling to litigants in the hope of manipulating the 
Court’s agenda—occurs and is highly effective in shaping case 
outcomes. This contributes to and corroborates previous judicial 
scholarship regarding strategic models of the agenda-setting process. 
Strategic models of the certiorari process show that when Justices 
decide to grant certiorari to a case, they take the preferences of their 
fellow members of the Court into consideration.131 The implication of 
this prior scholarship and our findings is that Justices, though 
motivated by their own policy preferences, account for their 
colleagues’ preferences in their strategies and have an incentive to 
take the pivotal Justice’s preferences into consideration when 
deciding whether to grant certiorari. Our analysis expands this 
approach, illustrating that there can be more than one pivotal Justice 
in any case because multiple dimensions of an issue potentially 
influence judicial preferences. 
Fifth, although we do not test this hypothesis directly, our results 
imply that litigants are highly responsive to Justices’ signals. Dissents 
referring to federalism result in a statistically significant increase in 
later cases on a given issue that are decided on federalism grounds, 
allowing dissenting judges to garner new majorities. 
Sixth, this Article begins to integrate models of agenda setting 
that previously have been applied only to Congress, and applies them 
to the Supreme Court. Though political scientists have accumulated 
substantial knowledge about the relationship between agenda control 
and congressional outcomes,132 many of these theories have not yet 
been applied to the Supreme Court. One reason for this failure to 
apply congressional theories to the Supreme Court is that the rules of 
the agenda-setting process in Congress are very different from those 
in the Supreme Court. In congressional agenda-setting models, there 
is an agenda setter, usually a congressional committee, that is 
responsible for bringing the “yea” or “nay” proposal to the floor. 
 
 131. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 56–111; Boucher & Segal, supra note 59, at 
829–36; Krol & Brenner, supra note 66, at 336; Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 387–90 (1982). 
 132. See, e.g., JAMES M. ENELOW & MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING: 
AN INTRODUCTION 131–68 (1984); Richard D. McKelvey & Norman Schofield, Generalized 
Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point, 55 ECONOMETRICA 923, 923–33 (1987); Thomas Romer 
& Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 
PUB. CHOICE 27, 27–29 (1978); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional 
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 85–92, 100–02 (1987). 
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Often, the setter must take the preferences of the legislature’s median 
voter into consideration when deciding the substance of the yea or 
nay question. Our theory suggests that strategic litigants are the 
agenda setters, somewhat analogous to congressional committees. 
Strategic Justices, analogous to the legislative body, provide clues 
about which questions to bring. This may open a diverse set of 
questions about the relationship between strategic litigants, the 
Justices on the Court, and the Court’s agenda. 
Probably the most important outcome of this analysis is its 
implications for future research. If signals about federalism can 
inspire future litigation, then there are perhaps other ways to signal in 
dissenting opinions so that litigants frame cases in the manner that 
the dissenting Justices would like them framed. As mentioned, 
signaling need not be limited to federalism. Moreover, signaling may 
not be restricted to dissenting opinions, but may occur in other forms, 
such as concurrences. Judges may even signal to other judges in other 
courts—higher court judges may send signals to lower courts as part 
of hierarchical control, or lower courts may signal cases worthy of 
reconsideration.133 Additionally, judges may signal to outside actors. 
For example lower court judges may signal for promotion purposes,134 
or Justices may send signals to the Senate about the Court’s overall 
position when the Senate is considering Supreme Court 
nominations.135 Judicial signaling may occur in a variety of contexts, 
with interesting implications for the content of other areas of 
Supreme Court policymaking and for our understanding of judicial 
behavior. 
 
 
 133. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial 
Dissent and Discretionary Review, 14 S. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2–7 (2006). 
 134. See Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in 
Federal District Court Opinions, 13 S. CT. ECON. REV. 63, 64–69 (2005). 
 135. Alvaro Bustos & Tonja Jacobi, Strategic Judicial Preference Revelation: Signaling in 
Judicial Nominations 2–5 (Jan. 8, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
